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ABSTRACT
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. John Deere (1966) placed neoclassical economic insights
at the heart of modern patent law. But economic theory has moved on. Since the 1990s, legal scholars
have repeatedly mined the discipline to propose ad hoc rules for individual industries, such as biotech and
software. So far, however, they have almost always ignored the literature’s broader lessons for doctrine.
This article asks how well today’s patent doctrine follows and occasionally departs from modern economic
principles. The analysis begins by reviewing what neoclassical economists have learned about innovation
since the 1970s. Legal scholars usually divide this literature into a half-dozen competing and distinct
“theories.” Naively, this seems to suggest that any patent doctrines based on these theories must be
similarly fragmented. This article offers a way out: far from being in conflict, the putatively separate
“theories” share so many common assumptions and mathematical methods that they can usefully be
analyzed as special cases of a single underlying theory. Furthermore, much of this theory is known. In
particular, it predicts that any economically efficient patent system must accomplish three tasks: (1)
limiting reward to non-obvious inventions; (2) choosing patent breadth to balance the benefits of
innovation against the costs of monopoly; and (3) prescribing rules for allocating patent rewards where
multiple inventors contribute to a shared technology. Remarkably, patent doctrine uses Graham’s
PHOSITA concept to address all three principles. This means that doctrinal solutions for one principle
can have unintended impacts on the others. This article shows that any doctrinal architecture built on
Graham’s PHOSITA test automatically allocates reward among successive inventors. Though reasonable,
these default outcomes fall short of the economic ideal. This article analyzes how changes in the Utility,
Blocking Patents, Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents, and the Written Description doctrines can mitigate
this problem. However, other gaps are inherent and cannot be eliminated without abandoning Graham
itself. This radically revised architecture would probably cause more problems than it solves.
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IDEAS INTO PRACTICE: HOW WELL DOES U.S. PATENT LAW IMPLEMENT MODERN
INNOVATION THEORY?
STEPHEN M. MAURER*
INTRODUCTION
Economists’ understanding of patent incentives has grown immensely in the
four decades since Professor Edmund Kitch wrote his seminal article.1 This is clearly
a good thing. At the same time, legal scholars have had a hard time mapping
insights about incentives onto patent doctrine. Since the early 1990s, the usual
response has been to divide the economic literature into a half-dozen or so
“theories”—the precise number differs from author to author—each of which is said
to be valid for some industries but not others.2 But this means asking judges to start
every case by selecting whichever theory or combination of theories best fits the facts
at hand. This “many theories” approach vests broad discretion in judges and
fragments patent doctrine into a potentially endless series of mini-statutes. While
economists have argued that this kind of approach might be efficient,3 it is hard to
believe that Congress intended such an outcome.
This article begins by arguing that the “many theories” premise is false. Far
from being in conflict, most of the economics literature shares common neoclassical4
assumptions and methods. For this reason, the putatively separate theories cannot
disagree in any fundamental way. But in that case, we can hope for a general
economic theory leading to universal principles and global legal rules.
This article asks how well current patent law implements the lessons of
neoclassical theory. In particular, we argue that any sufficiently unified neoclassical
theory of innovation incentives must endorse three specific policy goals: (1) limiting
reward for inventions that would be discovered in any case; (2) setting rewards that
* Berkeley Law School and Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California at
Berkeley. Address: Goldman School of Public Policy, 2607 Hearst Ave., Berkeley, CA 94720-9657;
smaurer@berkeley.edu.
1 Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265
(1977). As with most milestones, assertions that modern innovation economics dates from the 1970s
are inherently arbitrary. One might equally argue that the main economic arguments for and
against patent law were qualitatively understood in the 1860s. Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism,
899 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899, 907–08 (2002) (documenting Victorian dissatisfaction with the patent
system that parallel modern concerns); Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in
the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 1 (1950).
2 See infra note 16 for an extended list.
3 See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 117–18 (2004) [hereinafter
SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES] (arguing that different industries have dramatically
different R&D costs and/or ability to extract revenue from consumers, which make it “almost
inevitable” that a one-size-fits-all patent reward “underreward[s]” some inventors and
“overreward[s]” others).
4 The term “neoclassical economics” conventionally refers to an approach to economics that
relates supply and demand in a marketplace to an individual or firm’s hypothesized maximization of
profits and utility. See Antonietta Campus, "Marginal Economics," The New Palgrave: A Dictionary
of Economics, v. 3, p. 323 (1987).
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balance the benefits of innovation against the burden of monopoly prices and
wasteful duplication of effort; and (3) allocating rewards to cover each innovator’s
costs when successive advances contribute to a common technology. Remarkably, we
will see that current patent doctrine uses a single concept—Graham’s “Person
Having Ordinary Skill in the Art” (“PHOSITA”)5—to address all three goals.
Inevitably, this creates problems. We show that any version of patent law that uses
a Graham non-obviousness threshold to address our first goal automatically sets
“default choice” rules for reaching our third goal. Though reasonable, these rules fall
well short of the incentives endorsed by neoclassical theory. In what follows, we
show that the fit can be improved by adding defenses (e.g. the Reverse Doctrine of
Equivalents) that require jurors to perform additional fact inquiries. That said, no
amount of tinkering can eliminate the discrepancy entirely. This implies that any
doctrine built on Graham non-obviousness is inherently flawed and that truly
fundamental reforms would—assuming that they are possible at all—require
fundamental changes to current law.
We proceed as follows. Part II discusses how innovation economics research has
entered the legal literature. It argues that the “many theories” viewpoint is
overstated and that most of the literature can be readily grouped within a coherent
“neoclassical core.” Part III uses this neoclassical core to identify three policy goals
that any economically efficient patent statute must try to accomplish. Part IV
reviews the Utility Doctrine and compares it against modern economic insights. Part
V explores a puzzle: R&D costs are ubiquitous in economic theory but seldom if ever
mentioned in doctrine. We argue that patent law overcomes this difficulty by using
the PHOSITA concept to measure inventive cleverness as a proxy for effort and cost.
We also discuss how litigation uncertainty improves the match between doctrine and
economically efficient incentives. Part VI analyzes the allocation rules generated by
Graham’s PHOSITA test in a simple Literal Infringement scenario. Strikingly, we
find that the test generates reward allocations that are facially reasonable but highly
imperfect. Part VII extends the analysis to the Doctrine of Equivalents. Part VIII
examines how defenses based on the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents, Pioneer
Patents, and Written Description defenses can improve the alignment between
doctrine and economically efficient incentives. Part IX assesses the gaps between
patent doctrine and our three policy goals and asks whether a fundamentally
different architecture could do better. Part X presents a brief conclusion.
I. THE SEARCH FOR A GENERAL THEORY
No one doubts that a general theory of patent law is desirable. 6 How could they?
We live in an age where general theories—sometimes even “Theories of Everything”7
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 19 (1966).
John F. Duffy, Patent System Reform: Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 685, 693 (2002) (“The most compelling justification for harmonization in
patent law mirrors the justification for creating a patent system in the first place, for both are
efforts to account for the positive externalities associated with the creation of technical
information.”) (emphasis omitted).
7 See, e.g., STEPHEN W. HAWKING, THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING (2005).
5
6
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—are praised to the skies.8 The only real question is whether we know how to build
such a thing.
This Section begins by asking what we mean by a general theory. For the sake
of definiteness, we illustrate our argument with paradigmatic examples from physics.
We then review various “theories” that legal scholars have identified in the
economics literature. Significantly, most of this work shares the same neoclassical
assumptions (rational actors, profit maximization) and mathematical methods
(optimization calculus). Within this “neoclassical core,” any disagreements are
superficial and can usually be traced to special industry-specific factual assumptions.
From this perspective, the putatively separate “theories” are more accurately seen as
special cases of a common underlying theory. This should encourage patent law
reformers to search for broad principles and rules of general application.
A. The Gold Standard: Classical Physics
We begin by recalling what a really powerful theory looks like. Here the
paradigmatic example is Newtonian physics. Consider the path of a moving object.
Plainly, one can imagine many different versions of this problem. For example we
can analyze the object’s path when it is allowed to move freely in three dimensions
like a planet orbiting the sun (Problem A). Alternatively, we can analyze the much
simpler problem of how fast it moves when forced to follow a track or inclined plane.
(Problem B). On the one hand, both problems are clearly related. But on the other,
the solutions look very different on the page.9 The question is, should we emphasize
the commonalities or points of difference? One could say that Problem A is a
“different theory” than Problem B, but that distinction is misleading. In practice,
physicists almost always say that B is a “special case” of the “general theory” A.10
The difference is more than semantic. Problem B, being less general, is almost
always easier to solve than Problem A. Indeed, this is usually why Problem B was
chosen in the first place. On the other hand, each special case identifies features that
must also appear in the general theory.11 For a physicist, finding this general
solution could be an end in itself. General solutions also have practical power. For
example, engineers might use a general solution to plot lowest-energy trajectories for
spacecraft traveling between any two points in the solar system. In both cases, there
is an obvious incentive to unify the special cases as much as possible.

8 For a recent example, see In Praise of Particle Physics: Higgs Ahoy!, THE ECONOMIST (Dec.
17, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21541825 (describing a triumphant account of how
physicists found evidence for the Higgs boson, a long-hypothesized particle needed to reconcile the
Standard Model of particle physics with observed subatomic particles and masses).
9 Compare 1 RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, ROBERT B. LEIGHTON & MATTHEW SANDS, Motion, in THE
FEYNMAN LECTURES ON PHYSICS 8–10 (Addison-Wesley 1964) (analyzing a ball rolling down an
inclined plane), with 1 FEYNMAN ET AL., Newton’s Laws of Dynamics, in THE FEYNMAN LECTURES
ON PHYSICS 9–7 (calculating planetary orbits).
10 See, e.g., RICHARD WOLFSON, SIMPLY EINSTEIN 174 (2003) (“Special [in Einstein’s special
theory of relativity] means specialized, limited, restricted—to the special case of uniform motion.”).
11 Id.
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Not surprisingly, this can be hard. One obvious problem is that physicists may
not know the general theory.12 Fortunately, it is often enough to suspect that a
general theory exists and guess at principles. 13 On the other hand, some general
theories are known but lack general solutions. 14 Even if a general theory exists,
engineers may still be restricted to special (and solvable) cases. 15
The corresponding agenda for patent law is clear. Economists, like physicists,
have been groping toward a general theory of innovation. And lawyers, like
engineers, would like to exploit this knowledge to design doctrines that accelerate
innovation at the lowest possible cost. As in our physics example, we cannot know
whether this agenda will be successful. At the same time, we can be sure of one
thing—we will never know unless we try. This article begins the experiment.
B. How Lawyers See the Economics Literature
It has become conventional for legal scholars to stylize the economics literature
in terms of competing theories.16 The practice seems to have originated in a 1990
12 This was the case for electromagnetism between 1831 and 1865, and relativity between 1905
and 1917. See, e.g., ROY PORTER, THE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF SCIENTISTS (Oxford Univ.
Press, 2d ed. 1994) (entries for Faraday, Maxwell, and Einstein).
13 For example, Maxwell’s final theory of electromagnetism includes one law previously known
to Faraday and a second law that Ampere discovered and Maxwell corrected. Graham Hall,
Maxwell’s Electromagnetic Theory and Special Relativity, 366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y
1849, 1855–56 (2008), available at http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/366/1871/1849.full
.pdf+html.
14 The legend of Mohammed’s Coffin provides an entertaining example. According to medieval
folklore, the Prophet Mohammed was buried in such a way that magnets kept his coffin perpetually
suspended between heaven and earth. Samuel Earnshaw proved in 1842 that no general solution to
the Mohammed’s coffin problem exists. There are, however, solutions for special cases including the
one-dimensional problem and time-varying electric fields. Philip Gibbs & Andre Geim, Levitation
Possible, RADBOUD UNIV. NIJMEGEN (Mar. 18,
1997), http://www.ru.nl/hfml/abouthfml/levitation/diamagnetic/levitation-possible/. A lawyer would call these solutions “ad hoc rules.”
15 See, e.g., Günter Rothe, Two Solvable Cases of the Traveling Salesman Problem,
TECHNISCHEN UNIVERSITÄT GRAZ 1 (1988), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1
.1.8.2643. “The traveling salesman problem is known to be NP-hard . . . which implies that no
algorithm is known currently which finds an optimal tour in polynomial time.” Id. One approach
around this challenging aspect is by “identif[ying] restricted classes of the problem for which
efficient solutions are possible.” Id.
16 See Amelia S. Rinehart, Patents As Escalators, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 81, 95–96, 108–
10 (2011) (discussing prospect and option pricing theories); Robert P. Greenspoon & Catherine M.
Cottle, Don’t Assume a Can Opener: Confronting Patent Economic Theories With Licensing and
Enforcement Reality, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 194, 197 (2011) (discussing reward, prospect,
and commercialization theories); Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories About
the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES 1031, 1038–44 (1998) (discussing reward,
disclosure, commercialization, and broad prospect theories); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing
Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 341, 377–78 (2010) (discussing reward, prospect, commercialization,
signaling, and transaction cost theories); Andrew Blair Stanek, Increased Market Power as a New
Secondary Consideration In Patent Law, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 707, 731 n.136 (2009) (identifying five
economic theories posited over time for the patent system); Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont,
Research Tool Patents After Integra v. Merck--Have They Reached a Safe Harbor?, 14 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 367, 371-73, 386 (2008) (discussing inducement-to-invent, incentive to
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article by Professors Robert Merges and Richard Nelson, who criticized earlier
scholars for “assum[ing] that invention is the same in all technologies.” 17 They
divided the economics literature into three categories.18 First, there were traditional
models that examined incentives for a single inventor working in isolation. 19 These
almost always focused on “a simple tradeoff” between “incentives to the inventor and
underuse of the invention due to patent monopolies.”20 Second, there were more
recent theories in which innovation proceeded on the basis of “many actors” operating
invest, reward, disclosure, and anticommons theories); Carol M. Nielsen & Michael R. Samdzija,
Compulsory Patent Licensing: Is It a Viable Solution in the United States?, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 509, 517–19 (2007) (discussing prospect, cumulative innovation, anticommons, and
patent thicket, theory); David B. Conrad, Mining the Patent Thicket: The Supreme Court's Rejection
of the Automatic Injunction Rule in eBay v. MercExchange, 26 REV. LITIG. 119, 132–137 (2007)
(discussing reward, disclosure, commercialization, and prospect theories); F. Scott Kieff,
Coordination, Property and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive
Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 398–435 (2006) (discussing reward, rent
dissipation, anticommons, prospect, and commercialization theories); Richard S. Gruner, Corporate
Patents:
Optimizing Organizational Responses To Innovation Opportunities and Invention
Discoveries, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 39, 47, 50, 52 (2006) (discussing reward, prospect,
disclosure, and rent dissipation theories); Peter Fox, It’s Not Over the for the Product of Nature
Doctrine Until the Synthetic Super-Heavy Element (‘SHE’) Sings, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1005, 1011 n.47
(2006) (discussing reward, prospect, race-to-invent, and rent dissipation theories); Timothy R.
Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 132–33, 147, 149 (2006) (discussing
reward, portfolio, prospect, incentive, and signaling theories); Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim
Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 117–
23, 120 n.374 (2005) (discussing competitive innovation, prospect theory, and cumulative
innovation); Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain
Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1353–69 (2004) (discussing prospecting,
information costs, business asset, and industry regulation theories of patent law); Dan L. Burk &
Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1600–14 (2003) [hereinafter Burk
& Lemley, Policy Levers] (discussing prospect, competitive innovation, cumulative innovation,
anticommons, and patent thicket theories); Julian D. Forman, A Timing Perspective on the Utility
Requirement in Biotechnology Patent Applications, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 647, 665–80 (2002)
(discussing “prospect,” “reward,” and Anticommons theory); Mark. D. Janis, Second Tier Patent
Protection, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 151, 209–11, 218 (1999) (discussing prospect, reward, and
anticommons theories); Phanesh Koneru, To Promote the Progress of Useful Articles? An Analysis of
the Current Utility Standards of Pharmaceutical Products and Biotechnology Research Tools, 38
IDEA 625, 629–53 (1998) (discussing reward, patent-induced, prospect, race-to-invent, and rent
dissipation theories); Craig A. Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415,
1419, 1419 n.13 (1995) (discussing reward, disclosure, prospect, and rent dissipation theories).
Probably the most systematic “many theories” analysis is found in A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified
Economic Theories of Patents—the Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 268 (1996)
(asking if any one of five economic theories of patent incentives supplies a “unifying economic theory
of patents”). Unlike the present article, however, Professor Oddi is not looking for a unified theory
of innovation that might (or might not) lead to ideal patent rules. Rather, he asks whether existing
law follows from one of his economic theories. Id. at 270–71. Indeed, he even rejects theories on the
ground that they are not “consistent with the [current] patent statute, its substance and procedure.”
Id. at 271. Not surprisingly, the quest fails. Indeed, Oddi concludes that some decisions are “better
explained by doctrine than by any economic theory.” Id. at 290.
17 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 843 (1990).
18 Id. at 868–78.
19 Id. at 868.
20 Id.
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over “many rounds.”21 Following Kitch, these theories often produced arguments in
favor of broad patents that deliberately promoted “single-firm domination of a
technological prospect.”22 Third, and finally, Merges and Nelson argued that the
usual neoclassical assumption that firms are rational and maximize profits could
fail.23 In this case, Kitch-type arguments disappear so that narrow patents are once
again preferred.24
Scholars have updated Merges and Nelson’s categories over the years. In their
influential 2003 article, Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley subdivide Merges
and Nelson’s second (multi-inventor) category into “Prospect Theory,” “Competitive”
innovation, and “Cumulative Innovation.” 25 Similarly, they divide the third category
into “Anticommons Theory” and “Patent Thickets.”26 Despite small variations from
author to author, this expanded list continues to dominate contemporary academic
discussion.27
Inevitably, this “many theories” viewpoint implies a choice. In the easy cases,
one published theory will indeed fit all of the available facts. This, however, can only
happen by accident. As Merges and Nelson acknowledge, individual industries will
more commonly display “some attributes” of the published theory while
“not . . . shar[ing] all the features.”28 They may also have “particular characteristics
of [their] own” that do not fit any theory at all. 29 Logically, judges can address such
cases in just two ways: pick an existing category knowing that the fit is imperfect, or
else let the number of recognized “theories” proliferate indefinitely. While Merges
and Nelson do not address the issue in detail, they are plainly open to the latter
choice.30 Despite arguing that four categories cover much of the U.S. economy,31 they
admit that still more categories could be needed in the future. 32 Worse, they remark

Id. at 869.
Id. at 870–72.
23 Id. at 872.
24 Id. at 873–75. Merges and Nelson argue, in particular, that real firms may not be satisfied
with sub-optimal performance, have organizational biases that limit their rationality, and/or be
unable to agree on probable outcomes even in principle. Id. at 872–73.
25 Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1600–10.
26 Id. at 1624–30.
27 See supra note 16.
28 Merges & Nelson, supra note 17, at 882–83; cf. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 691, 738 (2004) [hereinafter Burk &
Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle] (arguing that the biotechnology industry is “properly
described in part by the anti-commons theory . . . and in part by prospect theory”).
29 Merges & Nelson, supra note 17, at 882.
30 Id. at 842–43.
31 Id. at 880–84. The four categories are “discrete invention[s]” (for example, the King Gillette
safety razor and the ball point pen), “cumulative technologies” (such as electric lighting,
automobiles, aircraft, radio, semiconductors, and computers), “chemical technologies” (bulk
chemicals and pharmaceuticals), and “science-based industries” (such as biotechnology). Id.
32 Id. at 880 (arguing that the U.S. economy is adequately described by “at least” four
categories).
21
22
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that industries may host multiple theories so that the correct choice can differ from
firm-to-firm and even product-to-product.33
This modern trend marks a fundamental departure from patent law’s historic
emphasis on rules of general application. 34 Despite this, modern scholars continue to
treat policy questions as an exercise in picking and choosing between economic
theories.35 Judges have been similarly fond of inventing industry-specific rules.36
C. Searching for Unity: The Neoclassical Core
Once legal scholars decided on a “many theories” approach, the rise of industryand sometimes even product-specific rules became inevitable. 37 But was the decision
necessary? In what follows, we review the economic literature’s main strands and
find evidence for their underlying unity.
We begin by examining the literature on individual inventors. This genre is
variously called reward,38 incentive to invent,39 and inventive40 theory.
33 See id. at 882–83 (arguing that chemical products with a single application are “discrete
entit[ies],” but chemical products with multiple applications are not). Additionally, processes for
making chemicals are “cumulative” technologies. Id. at 883.
34 Samantha A. Jameson, The Problems of the Utility Analysis in Fisher and Its Associated
Policy Implications and Flaws, 56 DUKE L.J. 311, 339 (2006) (noting that the patent system
“[t]heoretically . . . ‘provides technology-neutral protection to all kinds of technologies’”) (citing Dan
L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156
(2002) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Patent Law]); Burk & Lemley, Patent Law, at 1160 (noting that
patent law traditionally stressed “unified rules” for a “homogeneous world”).
35 See Alan Devlin, Patent Law’s Parsimony Principle, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1693, 1721
(2010) (arguing that patent rules should be “discriminately” adjusted to correct “over-rewarding” of
inventors in the business methods, computer software, and medical diagnostics industries); Michael
A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 38–42
(2004) (identifying eleven industries where “patents are less critical for innovation than the
traditional theory would posit,” and implying the need for narrower patents and/or a “greater role
for defenses to claims of patent infringement”).
36 See generally Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1593 (claiming that the
Federal Circuit goes to “inordinate lengths to find biotechnological inventions nonobvious” while
simultaneously “impos[ing] stringent enablement and written description requirements . . . ”). The
situation in software is exactly reversed. Id.
37 See generally id. at 1577 (suggesting patent laws, as “actually applied to different
industries[,] increasingly diverge”); Merges & Nelson, supra note 17, at 843 (suggesting several
models of technical advance in industry and that the scope of patent depends on the nature of
technology in an industry).
38 For recent examples, see Lisa L. Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information? 25
HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 531, 541 (2012); Greenspoon & Cottle, supra note 16, at 196; Rinehart, supra
note 16, at 87, 89 n.42.
39 Kieff, supra note 16, at 399–400; Yusing Ko, An Economic Analysis of Biotechnology Patent
Protection, 102 YALE L.J. 777, 791–92 (1992). The usage has the advantage of emphasizing
economic incentives over natural law arguments based on justice to the inventor. Oddi, supra note
16, at 273–74.
40 Laurie L. Hill, The Race to Patent the Genome: Free Riders, Hold Ups, and the Future of
Medical Breakthroughs, 11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 221, 238 (2003). Scholars sometimes note a
fourth incentive to disclose theory which holds that patents are needed to persuade inventors to
publish information that would otherwise be kept secret. See id.; Ko, supra note 39, at 795–98; Liza
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Regardless, the central focus is the same: adjusting the size of the patent reward for
maximum benefit to society.41 On the one hand, the reward must usually be high
enough to cover inventors’ R&D costs 42 and may require a bonus to accelerate R&D
or overcome the probability of failure or unexpected obstacles. 43 On the other, new
products are pointless unless consumers can afford them. Making the patent
monopoly too broad interferes with this goal. 44 While these points were already wellknown to Thomas Jefferson,45 modern neoclassical theory makes them precise. 46
Most legal scholars have absorbed this more careful and sophisticated language. 47
So far, we have concentrated on theories that address inventors in isolation.
However, real inventors often coexist and compete with one another. Professor
Kitch’s prospect theory48 was the earliest installment in this multi-inventor
literature.49 It argued that multiple, uncoordinated inventors were bound to
duplicate each other’s work and that this necessarily causes duplication and waste.
Broad patents overcome this problem by letting a single owner coordinate
development.50 Variants of Kitch’s argument add that patent owners can also use
their power to suppress rent-seeking51 and promote information-sharing.52 Many
scholars argue that these ideas are most relevant for R&D programs that
“commercialize” primitive prototypes into marketable products. 53 For this reason,
Kitch’s basic idea is often referred to as “development,”54 “incentive-to-innovate,”55 or
“innovation theory.”56
Vertinsky, An Organizational Approach to the Design of Patent Law, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
211, 221 (2012).
41 Kieff, supra note 16, at 435.
42 Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1585–86.
Unless otherwise stated, we
define the “cost” of an invention as the minimum amount of money needed to conduct a particular
R&D project.
43 See generally id. at 1585–87.
44 See, e.g., Merges & Nelson, supra note 17, at 870, 884; Ko, supra note 39, at 782.
45 See Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 7–9 (1966).
46 See generally Daniel M. Hausman, Economic Methodology in a Nutshell, 3 J. ECON. PERSP.
115, 117 (1989) (discussing the transition from “classical to neoclassical economics”).
47 See generally Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and
the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 86, 116–118 (1999) (arguing that patents internalize the
positive externalities of innovation and discourage free-riding); Forman, supra note 16, at 663
(identifying “traditional view of the patent bargain” in terms of free ridership, public goods, and
monopoly pricing); Hill, supra note 40, at 238 (noting that freeriding may delay invention).
48 Kitch, supra note 1, at 266. In contrast to later commentators, Kitch himself did not adopt a
“many theories” viewpoint, saying, “[t]he reward theory is not questioned on its own terms. Rather
it is argued that the reward theory offers an incomplete view of the functions of the patent system.”
Id.
49 Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1603–04.
50 Id. at 1615–16.
51 Forman, supra note 16, at 665; Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent
Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 253 (1994).
52 Ko, supra note 39, at 801.
53 See generally Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1583.
54See Forman, supra note 16, at 665 (arguing that Kitch’s theory is focused on “the further
development of prospects”); Rai, supra note 47, at 120–21.
55 Teresa M. Summers, The Scope of Utility in the Twenty-First Century: New Guidance for
Gene-Related Patents, 91 GEO L.J. 475, 491–93 (2003); see also Ko, supra note 39, at 799 (incentive
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Kitch’s theory was based on accidental duplication, i.e. the idea that noninteracting inventors would inevitably duplicate each other’s work.57 Racing theory
extends this idea by pointing out that the case for interacting inventors is even
worse.58 Patent law, after all, only rewards the first inventor while second-comers
get nothing. The resulting patent races can be beneficial to the extent that they
accelerate innovation and provide redundancy against failure. 59 But the drive to be
first—even by an hour or two60—can also force competing R&D programs deep into
diminishing returns. This, of course, is wasteful. As in the classical reward
literature, racing theory teaches that policymakers should pick whichever reward
level offers the greatest net benefit. 61
Finally, cumulative innovation addresses how the patent reward should be
divided when multiple inventors contribute to a common technology.62 Here, the key
insight is that a first generation (“1G”) invention offers two distinct benefits to
society. First and most obviously, it yields present value by telling society how to
make products for immediate use. 63 Second, it delivers option value by providing a
platform that second generation (“2G”) inventors can build on to invent still more
products.64 Ideally, inventors should proceed whenever all benefits including option
value exceed total costs. This cannot happen, however, so long as each inventor’s
reward is limited to the revenues earned by his or her products. In this case,
inventors who produce intermediate (pre-commercial) inventions receive nothing for
option value so that the technology is never developed at all. Correcting this problem
means allocating part of the 2G (3G, 4G, 5G . . . ) inventor’s revenues back to the
invention’s forebears. We return to this problem below.

to innovate); A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection In the Twenty-First
Century, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1097, 1110 (1989).
56 Hill, supra note 40, at 238–39.
Hill somewhat confusingly divides prospect theory
(suppressing wasteful and duplicative investments) from innovation theory (covering
commercialization costs). Id. Vertinsky argues that Kitch’s prospect theory is more usefully seen as
an aspect of commercialization. Vertinsky, supra note 40, at 221.
57 Rai, supra note 47, at 819–20.
58 Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 709, 752 (2012).
59 Id. at 753–54.
60 See Peter Carlson, The Bell Telephone:
Patent Nonsense?, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2008),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-02-20/news/36916760_1_bell-great-grandson-seth-shulmantelephone-gambit (describing how Alexander Graham Bell filed his patent application for the
telephone the same day as his nearest rival, Elisha Gray); see also Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126
U.S. 1, 18 (1888).
61 Greenspoon & Cottle, supra note 16, at 197; see also George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential
Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 126–27
(2010).
62 See, e.g., SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES, supra note 3, at 127–59; Jerry R. Green
& Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON., 20,
20–21 (1995); Suzanne Scotchmer, “On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation,” RAND
Journal of Economics, 26(1): 20-33 (1995); S. Scotchmer, “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants:
Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON PERSP. 29, 30 (1991) [hereinafter Scotchmer,
Shoulders of Giants]; Ofer Tur-Sinai, Cumulative Innovation in Patent Law: Making Sense of
Incentives, 50 IDEA 723, 731, 741–42 (2010).
63 See Scotchmer, Shoulders of Giants, supra note 62, at 31.
64 Green & Scotchmer, supra note 62, at 22.
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So far we have stressed the differences between our different neoclassical
innovation models. These invariably involve contingent facts (one inventor versus
many, non-interacting inventors versus racing inventors) that differ from industryto-industry. What really matters, though, are the commonalities. First, each of the
foregoing literatures assumes that firms maximize profits.65 Second, each assumes
that actors pursue this goal rationally. 66
Third, each invokes the same
methodology—supply, demand, and occasionally game theory. Finally, all depend on
the same mathematical machinery of calculus and optimization.
These
commonalities guarantee that the putatively separate theories cannot disagree in
any deep sense. In keeping with our physics discussion, we should instead think of
these individual theories as fact-dependent special cases. This encourages us to look
for unifying principles and rules of general application. 67
D. Beyond Neoclassical Theory
In keeping with the legal literature’s conventional categories, we end with
theories that reject the assumptions, methods, and even goals of neoclassical
economics. These have enjoyed something of a renaissance in the two decades since
Merges and Nelson wrote their article.
The Anticommons concept is by far the biggest development.68 Though often
denoted a theory,69 a close reading of Professors Michael Heller and Rebecca
Eisenberg’s seminal paper shows that the idea is really a conjecture that—
notwithstanding naïve neoclassical predictions—intellectual property owners
routinely fail to negotiate licenses that would allow otherwise profitable transactions
to go forward.70 Heller and Eisenberg then offer three reasons (“structural concerns”)
65 See, e.g., Greenspoon & Cottle, supra note 16, at 197 (noting that each patent theory is based
on the assumption that an actor is attempting to “maximize his or her own private welfare”).
66 See, e.g., id. (noting that each patent theory is based on the assumption that “the individuals
or entities who innovate and patent are wealth-seeking rational actors”).
67 This situation is normal in law, where legislators and judges almost always act on less-thanperfect information.
68 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998) [hereinafter Heller, Anticommons]; Michael A.
Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1166–67 (1999); Michael A. Heller &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research,
280 SCI. 698, 698–99 (1998) (extending Anticommons concept to patent law); MICHAEL HELLER, THE
GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND
COSTS LIVES 1–22 (Basic Books, 2008) (providing a more recent and detailed account of the
Anticommons conjecture).
69 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Autonomy and Independence:
The Normative Face of
Transaction Costs, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 145, 146 (2011).
70 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 68, at 699–700.
Despite more than a decade’s effort,
statistical studies have so far failed to find empirical evidence for the Anticommons conjecture. See,
e.g., Tom Magerman, Bart Van Looy, & Koenraad Debackere, In Search of Anti-Commons: PatentPaper Pairs in Biotechnology, an Analysis of Citation Flows (Druid Soc’y, Working Paper, 2011),
available at http://druid8.sit.aau.dk/acc_papers/ikjb8ctjuic82cfejdxmtj9ab17k.pdf; Chris Holman,
Commentary, Clearing a Path Through the Patent Thicket, 125 CELL 629, 630 (2006) [hereinafter
Holman, Clearing a Path]; John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho & Wesley M. Cohen, Patents, Material

[12:644 2013] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

656

why this could happen.71 The first (“transaction costs” and “strategic behaviors”)
notes that even neoclassical theory predicts occasional deadlock.72 Examples include
so-called mixed strategy games, in which players veto profitable agreements in hopes
of being bought off,73 and the familiar dynamic that forces owners of monopoly
complements to set higher prices than a cartel would.74
If this were all, one could still hope to unify the Anticommons with neoclassical
theory. However, Heller and Eisenberg’s next two concerns make this impossible.
The first denies profit maximization.75 All would be well, the authors argue, if every
patent owner was trying to maximize profit. 76 But suppose the parties pursue
different and perhaps incompatible goals like a desire to hurt rivals? 77 In such a
world, conventional microeconomic assumptions no longer hold.
Heller and Eisenberg’s final critique is even more fundamental. Neoclassical
theory assumes rationality. However, “cognitive biases” could lead actors to
“systematically overvalue their assets and disparage the claims of their opponents.”78
Taken literally, this implies that no two parties can ever agree on an invention’s
value.79
Given that so much of the Anticommons concept is based on rejecting
neoclassical assumptions, it is hard to see how any kind of unification is possible.
Still, one could imagine a situation where judges only ignore neoclassical predictions
in cases where Anticommons effects are strong. But when, exactly, is that? For
transactions involving two negotiators?
For ten?
For one hundred?
The
Anticommons literature does not say.
Patent Thickets. Neoclassical theory works best when transaction costs are
small and can be safely neglected.80 This condition is violated when patent searches
are prohibitively expensive.81 The question is, what then? Within the neoclassical
framework, economists usually invoke “transactions cost” arguments as a reason to
Transfers and Access to Research Inputs in Biomedical Research, (Sept. 20, 2005),
http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=776&cf=8. It is worth noting that Walsh et al.
find that companies take longer to develop scientific opportunities in heavily patented fields. Id.
However slender, this evidence suggests that Anticommons effects probably do exist at some level.
71 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 68, at 700.
72 Id.
73 Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 73 TEX L. Rev.
989, 1058–59 (1997) [hereinafter Lemley, Improvement in IP] (noting that rights holders may play a
game of chicken in which each argues that he is “irrational enough to kill the whole deal unless you
get more than your ‘fair’ share,” and that this strategy can “result in the parties failing to come to
terms at all”).
74 See, e.g., SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES, supra note 3, at 142–43.
75 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 68, at 700.
76 Id.
77 Id.
For example, Professor Lemley remarks that a government agency might try to
maximize public access, an author might try to suppress hostile reviews, and a business might want
to hurt rivals. Lemley, Improvement in IP, supra note 73, at 1059–61.
78 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 68, at 701.
79 See id. at 700–01.
80 DOUGLASS C. N ORTH, TRANSACTION COSTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 6
(1992).
81 T. Randolph Beard & David L. Kaserman, Patent Thickets, Cross-Licensing, and Antitrust,
47 ANTITRUST BULL. 345, 356–57 (2002).
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organize existing institutions differently. But suppose that the patent system is
already (nearly) as efficient as it can be. Then transactions costs are unavoidable
and we can imagine three distinct situations.
Small Transactions Costs.
If patent thicket effects are unimportant,
policymakers can ignore them.
Moderate Transactions Cost. Society should never invest more in an R&D
project than it hopes to gain from innovation. If transactions costs are truly
unavoidable, the fact that these costs involve, say, lawyers instead of bench
scientists, is immaterial. From this standpoint, we should be grateful if transactions
costs stop R&D projects from going forward.
Large Transactions Costs. It is possible to imagine a world where transaction
costs make all R&D projects prohibitively expensive. Here, patents yield few benefits
and should be abolished.
The problem, for now, is that the Patent Thicket literature—like the
Anticommons—says almost nothing about how to identify these cases in practice.
Other Theories. One can, of course, conjure up additional theories indefinitely.
In practice, this usually means suspending particular neoclassical assumptions.
Professor Vertinsky has compiled an extended list of how non-neoclassical theories
based on bounded rationality, imperfect information, and/or opportunism could
potentially improve doctrine.82 Strikingly, however, almost all of these insights are
narrow or ambiguous. While they may sometimes extend neoclassical theory, they
cannot replace it.
Natural Law. So far, we have focused on theories that reject neoclassical
assumptions. However, the goal of neoclassical theory—maximizing society’s total
wealth—is also a choice. If we want to, we can set different goals. For natural law,
this usually means justice to the inventor.83
The problem, once again, is predictive power. 84 Natural law provides a
reasonably precise theory of why someone who creates a physical object should own
it. But re-potting this idea in patent law leads to difficulties. How broad should
patent right be? Should the patent right (unlike physical property) expire? And if it

82 Vertinsky, supra note 40, at 221; see also Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy
and Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549, 641–42 (2010) (asserting that proliferation of
works subject to copyright, number of people owning copyrights, and type/size of separately owned
rights have complex and often contradictory impacts on author autonomy, publishers’ ability to
license, competition, diversity of expression, and distributive fairness).
83 For a modern version of these arguments, see generally ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 195–236 (2011). A detailed account of the 19th Century debate can be
found in Janis, supra note 16, at 155–59.
84 The predictive power of natural law suffers from the special problem that intuitions about
fairness and moral rights are notoriously subjective. This subjectivity can infect theory to the point
where it becomes too formless and ad hoc to offer useful guidance. Philosophers traditionally
manage this problem by insisting that any fairness judgment proceed by rigorous argument from
clear assumptions. Professor Merges has recently performed this service by deriving intellectual
property from conventional natural rights principles already familiar from the works of Kant, Locke,
and Rawls. The good news is natural law in Merges’ hands is far clearer and more prescriptive. The
bad news is that the gap between natural rights and conventional utility theory is, if anything, even
clearer and deeper than it was before. See MERGES, supra note 83, at 31–101.
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does, how long should temporary ownership last? Natural law does not answer these
questions.
E. Privileging The Neoclassical Core
Neoclassical theory is remarkably unified and coherent. We argue in the next
section that these qualities provide clear and determinate guidance for doctrine. At
the same time, we should be careful to construct doctrine on the broadest and most
general foundations available. Conversely, we should only discard rival, nonneoclassical theories—some of which routinely appear in the legal literature—when
unification is impossible so that we are forced to choose between neoclassical theory
and its narrower and less useful rivals.
The obstacles to unification are deepest for natural law. The basic difficulty is
that the elegance and power of neoclassical theory depends on a very special (“Pareto
optimal”) definition of economic efficiency.85 But natural law starts from a very
different (“fairness to the inventor”) goal. Assuming that it could be constructed at
all, any theory that combines utility and natural law is bound to be clumsy and
indeterminate. And of course, American law has already made its choice. As
Professor Lemley remarked, the “primacy of incentive theory in justifying intellectual
property” is anchored in the language of the Constitution’s Patent and Copyright
Clause86 as interpreted by case law.87
The prospects for unification within other, non-neoclassical branches of
economics are brighter. Indeed, economists routinely construct non-neoclassical
theories.88 The problem, for now, is that the Anticommons and patent thickets are
not yet theories in this sense. Should judges start to worry when the number of
overlapping patents is two, or eight, or fifty? Are there simple institutional
arrangements – for example cross-licenses that can overcome the Anticommons? The
literature does not say.
In many ways, the situation is similar to antitrust law, which invokes
neoclassical economics to offer a single cure (“more competition”) to the world’s ills. 89
Strikingly, judges do this even though microeconomic theory acknowledges that
competition can sometimes lead to disaster. As the Supreme Court emphasized in

85 LaRue Tone Hosmer, Managerial Ethics and Microeconomic Theory, 3 J. BUS. ETHICS 315,
317 (1984).
86 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”).
87 Lemley, Improvement in IP, supra note 73, at 993; see also Merges & Nelson, supra note 17,
at 852 (“While there are those who may challenge the propriety of these goals from the standpoint of
economic policy, it is both realistic and necessary for courts and the patent office to pursue the goals
implicit in both constitutional and statutory provisions.”); Vertinsky, supra note 40, at 220–21
(“[T]he traditional justification for the patent regime in the United States has been largely a
utilitarian one based on the public goods aspect of invention.”).
88 See Vertinsky, supra note 40, at 224–25.
89 Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What
Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (1977).
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Trinko, such evils as do occur are best left to other bodies of law. 90 This article
argues that patent doctrine should similarly build on the underlying coherence of
neoclassical theory. To the extent that neoclassical assumptions fail, policymakers
can always fall back on tax policy, sponsored research, and other non-patent
incentives.
II. THREE POLICY GOALS
The fact that neoclassical theories are logically consistent encourages us to think
that we can write rules of general application. This Section begins the process by
extracting three policy goals that appear throughout the neoclassical literature.
A. Goal No. 1: Avoiding Redundant Incentives
Patents are superfluous for products that would be invented anyway.91 This can
happen for several reasons. First, inventors often obtain temporary monopolies even
without formal patents. This can happen because of “first-mover advantages” or
because they already possess market power over related goods. Second, society offers
many incentives besides patents, including prizes, grants, and subsidies. Finally, the
rise of open source communities reminds us that human beings are inherently
creative.92 This basal rate of innovation would presumably continue even if patents
disappeared entirely.93 In all of these cases, granting a patent imposes a tax on
innovation to no purpose.
These observations suggest that the patent system does not have to cover every
inventor’s full R&D costs. The problem is deciding where to draw the line.
Professors Wesley Cohen, Richard Nelson, and John Walsh have collected survey
evidence showing that CEOs in most industries see patent incentives as relatively
unimportant.94 However, their work also shows that the answer varies by industry.95
Verizon Comms. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004).
Phanesh Koneru, To Promote the Progress of Useful Art[icle]s?: An Analysis of the Current
Utility Standards of Pharmaceutical Products and Biotechnology Research Tools, 38 IDEA 625, 632
(1998) (explaining that patents should not be granted where inventions would be developed anyway
“for reasons unrelated to the existence of the patent reward”); Summers, supra note 55, at 486
(noting that “sufficient incentives for basic inventive activity [may] exist without the grant of a
patent”).
92 Purists may object that open source licenses routinely assert copyright and are themselves a
form of intellectual property. In practice, however, volunteers almost always join because of softer
incentives like altruism or a desire for education. By comparison, copyright’s role is secondary and
usually focuses on deterring negative behaviors that might otherwise destabilize the collaboration.
See Stephen M. Maurer, The Penguin and the Cartel: Rethinking Antitrust and Innovation Policy
for the Age of Commercial Open Source, UTAH L. REV. 269, 294 (2012).
93 The idea makes an early appearance in H. G. WELLS, THE WORLD SET FREE (1914). Wells
imagines a nuclear-powered world in which people respond to increased leisure time by becoming
more creative. Predictably, the novel later takes a darker turn.
94 Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets:
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not) 3 (Nat’l Bureau of
90
91
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Facts matter. Conversely, theory alone says very little about which inventions
should and should not be patented.
The Supreme Court famously addressed this problem in the 1960s. Its
Graham96 decision acknowledged the importance of “‘drawing a line between the
things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and
those which are not.’”97 It also announced a test: inventions should be patentable if
and only if they were “non-obvious” to a PHOSITA.98 We argue below that this is a
very useful concept. At the same time, the Court failed to explain why it put the
dividing line where it did. To the contrary, basing the standard on “average” skill
sounds like a confession of ignorance. Why not choose “above-average” skill or a
“blinding flash of inspiration?”99 We discuss these and other alternatives in Section
5.
B. Goal No. 2: Selecting the Right Level of Effort
An inventor can almost always create products sooner or more reliably if she is
willing to spend more. What she actually does depends on the reward. Here the
most natural guess is that the inventor will only invest where the expected reward 100
covers her R&D cost. On the other hand, society could rationally decide that it is
worth offering larger rewards to get inventions sooner or more reliably. The problem,
of course, is that this implies broader and/or longer-lasting patent monopolies. Given
diminishing returns, we should expect each increment of reward to provide less
benefit than the one before. For this reason, theory predicts that there is some
maximum patent duration and breadth beyond which further increases are
counterproductive. In Professor Kitch’s elegant summary, “The courts, influenced by
the reward theory, view the patent system as a difficult problem of trade-offs
between the incentive effects and the output constraining effects.” 101 Once again, the
correct tradeoff is heavily fact-dependent, so that theory provides only limited
guidance.
U.S. law defines patent breadth to embrace (a) whatever the inventor actually
claimed and disclosed in her patent, together with (b) certain “non-equivalent”
improvements and follow-on inventions. While the latter doctrine is vague, we argue
in Part VII that it almost certainly implies a PHOSITA-like cleverness standard. In
practice, judges and commentators usually assume that this standard is identical to
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at www.dklevine.com/archive/cohensurvey.pdf.
95 Id.
96 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
97 Id. at 10 (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
98 Id. at 3.
99 See Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 90–91 (1941) (patentable
device “must reveal the flash of creative genius.”)
100 The “expected value” of a reward refers to the sum of all possible rewards with each reward
multiplied by its probability of occurrence.
Expected Value Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/expected%20value (last visited June 1,
2013).
101 Kitch, supra note 1, at 282.
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Graham’s non-obviousness test. However, this is not the only choice and we will see
that Congress could pick a different cleverness standard if it wanted to.
C. Goal No. 3: Allocating Reward Among Multiple Inventors.
We have already noted that many inventions are “cumulative” in the sense that
progress depends on insights contributed by multiple, often-independent inventors
over time. Consider, for the sake of definiteness, the case where a first generation
(“1G”) invention establishes a new technology that receives 2G/3G/4G improvements
and culminates in a saleable 5G product. Assume further that success is uncertain
because the 5G product may turn out to be technically impossible or less popular
than investors originally hoped. Then an economically efficient patent system must
satisfy at least three separate and distinct criteria.
Allocate Profits. The 1G (2G, 3G . . . ) R&D programs will never be funded
unless patent owners expect to share in 5G revenues. Provided that the 5G product
earns enough revenue, each inventor in the chain should expect to recover his or her
investment.
Allocate Losses. The 1G (2G, 3G . . . ) investors know that they could easily end
up incurring more R&D costs than the 5G product will ever earn. In this case,
someone must bear the loss. Here, the principle of “sunk costs” insists that investors
at each stage should ignore past costs that have already been incurred and are now
beyond recovery.102 Instead, they should base their decision exclusively on the costs
of going forward.
Maximum Efficient Investment. Deciding whether to invest in an R&D program
is not the only question; investors must also decide how much. In general, we expect
each incremental increase in R&D budget to (on average) deliver more and better
products to consumers. This investment should only be made, however, if these
incremental benefits exceed incremental cost. This rule correctly prices the option
value of new technologies.
The economics literature provides a clear rule that gets these incentives right. 103
Each inventor should (a) retain enough revenue to cover her R&D cost, 104 and (b) pay
the balance to whichever inventor immediately preceded her. Following Professor
Ofer Tur-Sinai, we shall refer to this as the “Absolute Scope” rule in what follows. 105

102 Sunk Cost Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/sunk%20cost (last visited May 16, 2013) (“[A] cost already incurred that is not subject to
variation or revision.”).
103 The proposed rule follows SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES, supra note 3, at 127.
In principle, there may be other rules that satisfy our three criteria.If so, I am unaware of them.
104 More specifically, we want investors to recover revenue consistent with our first and second
goals. Rewards that simply repay R&D investments may be insufficient to the extent that inventors
lack, for example, access to capital.
105 Tur-Sinai, supra note 62, at 758.
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D. Reimagining Patent Doctrine
The next six sections ask how well current patent rules conform to modern
economic insights. We proceed as follows. Part IV (“Reimagining Utility”) asks when
an invention with no immediate end-use nevertheless offers sufficient social value to
be patentable. Part V (“Reimagining the PHOSITA”) argues that the Graham
standard is best understood as a measure of cleverness and, indirectly, R&D cost. In
the process, we generalize the PHOSITA concept to include the full range of
cleverness standards available to Congress. Parts VI–VIII analyze how well patent
doctrines that include the PHOSITA concept implement our third policy goal.
Finally, Parts IX and X look at the current system’s shortcomings and ask whether
radical change is worth pursuing.
III. REIMAGINING UTILITY
Any attempt to allocate reward among sequential inventors must start with the
threshold question of when 1G (2G, 3G . . . ) inventors should be allowed to share in
2G (3G, 4G . . . ) revenues. Following the innovation economics literature, we argue
that sharing should take place whenever inventions create “option value” for later
inventors to build on.106 We begin by reviewing judges’ efforts to generalize the
utility concept to inventions that have no present use and whose worth is based
entirely on option value. We then suggest a revised rule that rationalizes earlier
cases and brings doctrine into closer agreement with our third policy goal.
A. Modern Utility Doctrine
Early U.S. law provided that only “sufficiently useful and important” inventions
could be patented.107 This seemed to say that patent doctrine requires applicants to
show some minimum usefulness to consumers in the same way that Graham’s nonobviousness standard requires them to show cleverness. 108 The approach did not last
long. In 1817, Judge Story downgraded the utility requirement to capable of use and
not “frivolous.”109 This implied a de minimis standard in which “any quantity of
See Green & Scotchmer, supra note 62, at 22.
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117, 120 (1836) (amended 1870).
108 Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L REV. 1195, 1207, 1236 (2010)
[hereinafter Risch, Reinventing Usefulness]. Some federal courts continued to describe non-de
minimis utility thresholds in dictum well into the 20th Century. Id. The heresy was so prevalent
that contemporary scholars and jurists repeatedly warned practitioners not to confuse “positive
utility” with its “degree.” N. Scott Pierce, In re Dane K. Fisher: An Exercise in Utility, 6 J. HIGH
TECH. L. 1, 2 (2006); see also In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 954 (C.C.P.A. 1967)
109 Lowell v. Lewis 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568); see also Bedford v.
Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1217) (requiring only that invention be “capable of
use”). The Lowell opinion famously added that inventions should also not be “injurious to the wellbeing, good policy, or sound morals of society.” Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019. The Federal Circuit
overruled this “moral utility” element in Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
106
107
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utility should suffice.”110 Judge Story justified this result on the theory that patents
on worthless inventions were irrelevant in any case, since such learning would
“silently sink into contempt and disregard.” 111 In modern phrasing, the point seems
to be that the damage from monopoly (i.e., deadweight loss) can never be larger than
the monopolized product’s value to users. For this reason, there is nothing to be
gained from refusing to patent inventions that nobody wants. We can also glimpse a
second argument in Story’s comment: given that patenting costs money, no rational
inventor will ever pursue rights to an invention that he expects to be “disregarded.”
In this situation, the inventor’s willingness to invest already provides a market test
of value. A utility threshold that encourages judges to second-guess the inventor
overrules the very signal that patents are supposed to elicit.
For the most part, Judge Story’s rules are still valid today. Starting around
1950, however, courts reintroduced a non-de minimis threshold for chemical and
biological inventions.112 The basic doctrinal puzzle was that these industries—
unlike, say, the mechanical or electrical arts—were willing to invest in a “process for
producing a product of only conjectural use” or “an intermediate that can be used to
produce another class of compounds.”113 On the face of things, courts took a hard line
by demanding that some use must “presently exist.” 114 This, however, would have
ruled out intermediate inventions that commercial firms were plainly willing to pay
for. For this reason, judges softened the rule by noting that utility could still be
shown where “person[s] skilled in the art” would immediately recognize the product’s
capabilities provided that they were not “conjecture” or else so “unpredictable” as to
require “considerable experimentation.”115 Even so, the rule ignored the fact that

110 Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1910; see also Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, supra note 108, at 1207.
The invention did not have to perform better than competing prior art technologies. In re Ratti, 270
F.2d 810, 815 (C.C.P.A. 1959) (finding that an invention that was “no better than” the prior art was
nevertheless patentable).
111 Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019.
112 According to Judge Rich, pre-1950 chemical patent applications “were commonly granted
although no resulting end use was stated or the statement was in extremely broad terms.” In re
Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 950 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J., dissenting). Judge Rich believed that the Story
rule should apply to both intermediate and end-use discoveries. Id. at 1142. Like most ad hoc rules,
the idea that courts treat utility differently for chemical and biological inventions than other arts is
unsettling. Yet, as Professor Andrew W. Torrance (personal communication) remarks, it is probably
true that a poorly understood gene is more likely to be rejected on utility grounds than, say, an
unsittable chair. The practical reason for this is that the number of unsittable chair patents, unlike
chemical patents, is vanishingly small. In these circumstances, judges may feel safer issuing a bad
precedent than in invalidating a patent despite lingering doubts that the unsittable chair may, after
all, possess some overlooked social value. This section argues that the best way to eliminate such
doubts is to improve doctrine so that it more accurately reflects social value. Along the way, we
argue that some unsittable chairs really could have social value as stepping stones to commercial
(i.e., sittable) designs. If this improved understanding gives judges the confidence they need to
strike down genuinely useless chair patents, so much the better.
113 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 4.02[2][e] (2012).
114 Ex parte Tolkmith, 102 U.S.P.Q. 464, 466 (B.P.A.I. 1954).
115 Id. at 466. The fact that the compound was new did not bar patentability provided that it
“belong[ed] to a class of compounds the members of which have become well recognized to be useful
for a particular purpose, and it is evident from the prior art that it is within the skill of the art to
use the claimed compound for this purpose.” Ex parte Ladd, 112 U.S.P.Q. 337, 338 (B.P.A.I. 1955).
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many industries really do fund 2G projects based on unproven conjectures. In these
cases, at least, doctrine failed to protect option value.
The U.S. Supreme Court tried to rationalize the situation in 1966. Its Brenner
opinion asked whether a chemical compound, whose therapeutic effects had never
been tested, should nevertheless be patentable. 116 The justices rejected this
expansive result and instead announced that intermediate inventions would only
qualify for protection if they possess “specific benefit” and “substantial utility” in a
“currently available form.”117 The Court also advanced two policy arguments to
justify its holding. First, it raised the familiar point that inventions should relate to
“commerce” instead of “philosophy.”118 This distinction, however, seemed redundant
because the same concepts also helped to define patentable subject matter. 119 Just
what did utility add to the exercise?120 Perhaps sensing the problem, the Court
introduced a second and more novel objection: “A patent,” Justice Fortas observed,
should be more than a “hunting license.”121 While this sounds like a rejection of
option value, the Court was more likely referring to a very different problem in which
applicants patent worthless inventions in hopes of capturing after-arising
technologies that they did nothing to facilitate. 122
Courts have now spent half a century trying to generalize Brenner beyond its
facts. The earliest cases staked out an obvious bright line rule: the utility threshold
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 520 (1966).
Id. at 534–35.
118 Id. at 536. The Court’s argument continues to influence current scholars who argue that
utility provides a “timing” function for determining when an invention is “ripe.” Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and Economics Agenda for the Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV.
2081, 2087 (2000); Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the Patentability
of Certain Inventions Associated With the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 1,
6 (1995) (Utility “serves a timing function, leaving basic research discoveries in the public domain
until they have yielded tangible benefits and have thereby left ‘the realm of philosophy’ and entered
‘the world of commerce.”); Andrew T. Kight, Pregnant with Ambiguity: Credibility and the PTO
Utility Guidelines in Light of Brenner, 73 IND. L.J. 997, 1012 (1998) (“The utility requirement
operates to distinguish between basic research and applied technology.”); Arti K. Rai, Fostering
Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 839 (2001) (“In practice, however, only the utility requirement serves as a
particularly good proxy for differentiating upstream from downstream research.”); Risch,
Reinventing Usefulness, supra note 108, at 1220 (“[B]asic science, no matter how important and
valuable, does not merit protection and is therefore not useful in the patent sense.”).
119 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3249 (2010) (Stevens J., concurring) (patentable
subject matter does not include mere philosophical principles).
120 There is, of course, no rule against using multiple redundant doctrines to enforce a single
policy goal. Indeed, this can be forced on judges by poorly drafted statutes or tangled precedent. At
the same time, the practice invites confusion and risks “using up” levers that may be needed for
other policy goals.
121 Brenner, 383 U.S. at 536.
122 Because all legal systems are inherently imperfect, patent owners can sometimes assert
accidents of language to claim inventions that were actually developed by others. Judges have long
resisted this outcome. Dr. Zuhn points out that common law mining law similarly prevents miners
from claiming whatever minerals lie beneath randomly selected plots of land. Donald L. Zuhn, Jr.
DNA Patentability: Shutting the Door to the Utility Requirement, 34 J. MARSHALL. L. REV. 973, 973
(2001). See also William E. Ridgway, Realizing Two-Tiered Innovation Policy Through Drug
Regulation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1221, 1221 (2006) (setting the utility threshold too low leads to
inventors “stockpiling” instead of “developing” innovations).
116
117
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excludes products whose only known use is to make other products that similarly
lack known uses.123 This rule was most recently applied in In re Fisher, which denied
patentability to a list of genetic sequences—so-called “Expressed Sequence Tags” or
“ESTs”—that lack known functions.124 The reason, according to the Federal Circuit,
is that ESTs are mere “research intermediates” presenting no “assurance that
anything useful will be discovered in the end.”125
The case is harder for inventions that claim specific uses. Here, post-Brenner
utility analyses usually devolved into arguments over whether the evidence was
sufficient to prove the asserted capability. 126 Significantly, the required proof of
utility was much lower than the human trials that were needed to obtain FDA
approval and achieve “commercial usefulness”127 Instead, utility could be established
by animal tests and chemical similarity to previously-known drugs128 so long as these
methods offered a “reasonable correlation” or were “generally predictive” of end-use
capabilities.129 Not surprisingly, judges identified such proofs with the PHOSITA
concept, i.e., whether “one of ordinary skill in the art would accept appellant’s
claimed utility in humans as valid and correct” 130 or else would not doubt the utility

123 In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 945 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (rejecting patent claims for insufficient utility,
noting that “[i]t is not enough that the specification disclose that the intermediate exists and that it
‘works,’ reacts, or can be used to produce some intended product of no known use”); In re Joly, 376
F.2d 906, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (rejecting utility argument based on “mere disclosure that a claimed
chemical compound may be used as an intermediate to make other compounds, without regard for
the usefulness of the latter compounds”). Significantly, the Kirk court’s holdings were based on the
fact that many steroids “possess no activity whatsoever” and that the patented compound’s “actual
uses-or possible lack of uses” could only be determined by additional experimentation. Kirk, 376
F.2d at 942. These uncertainties did not, of course, show that the discoveries lacked sufficient
“option value” to justify 2G research.
124 In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
125 Id. at 1373 (quoting Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966)).
Judge Rader’s
exasperated dissent cogently argued that any research which took society “one step closer to
identifying and understanding a previously unknown and invisible structure” had social value and
that this value existed whether or not the particular invention represented “the final step of a
lengthy incremental research inquiry.” Id. at 1380 (Rader, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 1373 (“Fisher has not presented any evidence . . . showing that the claimed ESTs
have been used in either way.”); see also In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
127 In re Langer, 503 F.2d 1380, 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1974); accord In re ‘318 Patent Litigation, 583
F.3d 1317, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Brana, 51 F.3d at 1568. The distinction between commercial
and actual usefulness makes considerable sense. Absent FDA regulation, adventurous (or
desperate) consumers might well purchase drugs based on “actual usefulness” shown by animal test
results and/or a molecular resemblance to known compounds. “Commercial usefulness,” on the
other hand, suggests that the drug can be legally sold to consumers, i.e., that it is sufficiently well
documented to survive FDA testing. See id. (contrasting safety and efficacy with patent law
“utility”).
128 In re Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322, 1327 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
129 Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
130 Jolles, 628 F.2d at 1327–28; see also U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Utility Examination
Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001) (arguing that genes should be patentable where
“a person of ordinary skill in the art would immediately appreciate why the invention is useful”); Ex
parte Tolkmith, 102 U.S.P.Q. 464, 466 (B.P.A.I. 1954) (arguing that value of proposed parasiticide is
measured by whether its capabilities are apparent to “one skilled in the art”).
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based on animal testing.131 While this lent the analysis an aura of scientific
objectivity, it also begged the question of how a PHOSITA would decide just when the
numeric odds of success were large enough to be deemed “reasonable” or “generally
predictive.”132 By comparison, a complete answer would have required some explicit
judgment about which 2G projects are worth pursuing—an inquiry that necessarily
includes non-technical factors like researcher salaries and consumer demand. Not
for the first time, the PHOSITA standard let judges sweep these economic variables
under the rug.133
Despite doctrinal gymnastics, courts continue to tie utility to presently-existing
capabilities that—however hypothetically—consumers might actually want to use.
Strangely, judicial policy arguments are seldom so narrow. For example, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals argued in Cross that a low utility threshold is needed to
“marshal resources and direct the expenditure of effort to further in vivo testing . .
. thereby providing an immediate benefit to the public.” 134 Similarly, the Federal
Circuit has held that Brenner utility “necessarily includes the expectation of further
research and development.”135 Such arguments seem indistinguishable from option
value.
B. A Rationalized Utility Standard
The traditional utility test for ordinary “present value” inventions is simple:
does the invention do something that consumers might value? The problem, as we
have seen, is that industries often find commercial reasons to invest in inventions
that have no known end-use and hence no value to consumers.136 This puts judges
and bureaucrats in the awkward position of telling industry that its most promising
discoveries lack “real world” value.137
Following Judge Story, we argue that it is simpler—and also more economically
efficient—to define value with reference to actual consumers and markets. The
question is, which markets and which consumers? Current doctrine invariably
identifies “markets” and “consumers” with end-users. This, however, requires
fictitious inquiries into how much consumers would value inventions that will never
131 In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1995); but see Ex parte Aggarwal, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
1334, 1338 (B.P.A.I. 1992) (finding that evidence that compounds treated tumors in animals did not
provide sufficient evidentiary support for human applications).
132 Cross, 753 F.2d at 1050; see also Jolles, 628 F.2d at 1327–28 (holding that evidence that
inventor’s pharmaceutical compositions were analogous to existing anti-cancer agents was sufficient
to establish utility).
133 Courts also debate how “specific” the claimed end use must be. While the requirement is
clearly met by compounds that treat particular diseases, judges have stretched the concept to
include “known pharmacological activities” like reducing blood pressure. Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d
853, 855–56 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
134 Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
135 In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
136 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
137 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., REVISED INTERIM UTILITY GUIDELINES TRAINING MATERIALS
4 (1999), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/utility.pdf (noting that materials used for
industrial R&D lack “real world” value).
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be sold to the public. But this fiction is unnecessary. After all, there really is a
market for 1G results. Following the innovation literature, we argue that a 1G
invention only has value if someone, somewhere, is willing to develop it further.138
This transforms the issue of what end-users might or might not value into an
objective investment decision. The rule is also consistent. Inventions that fail to
attract 2G investors are automatically worthless to follow-on (3G, 4G, . . . )
developers, end-users, and society at large.
This option value viewpoint is already implicit in judicial tests that measure
value from the PHOSITA’s standpoint. However, economic theory sharpens this
instinct. Under our rationalized rule, an intermediate invention has value any time
an inventor would pay a non-zero (but possibly de minimis) fee to develop it.
Assuming profit-maximization,139 this judgment normally turns on three well-defined
variables.
Probability of Success. The 2G program must have some chance of success. We
have already noted that current patent doctrine stresses this scientific judgment.
Expected R&D Cost. The 2G project must not be “too costly” to develop. Naïvely,
this will be true whenever the expected reward is even slightly greater than expected
costs. This neatly replicates Judge Story’s de minimis rule that inventions should be
patentable whenever their economic value is even slightly greater than zero.
Expected Revenue. The 2G decision ultimately depends on an economic
judgment that consumer demand for the end product is large enough to cover R&D
costs.140
One benefit of using a PHOSITA standard is that it avoids making these
inquiries directly. Instead, following Judge Story, the PHOSITA’s judgment that
further investment is worthwhile serves as a conclusive test of value. While litigants
can address our three economic variables directly, it will often be enough to submit
less direct evidence. This could include the opinions of knowledgeable industry
observers or objective evidence that similar ideas have been funded in the past. At
the same time, our explicitly economic rule reminds courts that such showings can be
rebutted by evidence that option value has changed over time. This notably includes
cases where R&D costs fall or consumer demand increases. Finally, courts should
recognize that option value can sometimes exist even where the 1G inventor cannot
name a single 2G application.141 This can happen where the 1G inventor makes a
fundamental discovery but knows almost nothing about other industries or else

In the case of research tools, one might equally say to use the tool to conduct at least one
experiment. We ignore this essentially semantic distinction in what follows.
139 Our rule does not really need this assumption. The chance that a 1G invention may lead to
further development by non-commercial actors like universities, national laboratories, and open
source collaborations is also included in option value.
140 This judgment may, of course, depend recursively on a perception that 3G inventors are
willing to pay licensing fees. But in that case the 3G inventor must believe that a 4G inventor
would pay, and so on. Logically, all such chains must eventually end in some judgment about
consumers’ willingness to pay.
141 The best-known example is almost certainly the laser, which many contemporaries ridiculed
as a “solution looking for a problem.” Charles H. Townes, The First Laser, in A CENTURY OF NATURE:
TWENTY-ONE DISCOVERIES THAT CHANGED SCIENCE AND THE WORLD 107–12 (Laura Garwin & Tim
Lincoln eds., 2003).
138
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reasonably believes that some exceptionally clever inventor can find applications she
never thought of.
IV. REIMAGINING THE PHOSITA
Economists and lawyers speak different languages. This naturally leads to
problems. We have seen that each of our three economic principles is defined by
R&D cost. Yet, patent law hardly even mentions this concept. 142 This is not
necessarily fatal because law often uses proxies for quantities that are difficult or
impossible to measure directly. But if a proxy does exist, we should be able to name
it. Fortunately, the choices are limited. Open any introductory textbook and you will
see that patent law is constructed around a dozen or so core concepts.143 Of these,
only two concepts—“non-obviousness” and “utility”—say anything about what the
inventor has accomplished or, implicitly, invested. Furthermore, we have already
seen that utility measures value from the consumer’s perspective. This is a very
different concept from the inventor’s effort or cost. In the end, we are left with just
one possible proxy: Non-obviousness.144
This section introduces Graham’s PHOSITA test and explains how the idea can
be generalized to measure different levels of cleverness and, indirectly, effort and
cost. We then examine the PHOSITA test’s strengths and weaknesses as a costproxy. We close by commenting on how the proxy limits the doctrine’s ability to
implement economically efficient incentives.
A. The PHOSITA Standard
The Federal Circuit’s efforts to make patent law more rule-based and
predictable have encrusted the PHOSITA with properties that no actual person
possesses. On the one hand, she is a polymath who possesses “a complete and
thorough knowledge of all legally pertinent prior art.” 145 On the other, she is an
uninspired drudge who thinks almost entirely “along the line of conventional
wisdom” and brings little or no originality to R&D. 146 Clearly, we should not expect

142 As we shall see, the concept of R&D cost plays little or no role in the utility (Part VII), nonobviousness (Part V.B), or blocking patents (Part VIII.B) doctrines. It also plays no role in damages:
none of the fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors so much as mentions it. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United
States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
143 See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL AND & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE x–xii (4th ed. 2006).
144 We find further encouragement in the fact that judges tend to invoke the PHOSITA concept
in the same contexts where innovation economists stress R&D cost. This includes reward size, nonobviousness, and even utility. See infra Parts VI.B, VI.C, and VII.
145 Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE
L. J. 1590, 1606 (2011).
146 Id. at 1606–07 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir.
1985)). As Professors Abramowicz and Duffy write:
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to meet this person in real life. Like the proverbial “reasonable man,” she is best
seen as a construct or “ghost of the law.”147 We return to these points below.
For now, we take a different path. The phrase “ordinary skill” can be readily
identified with “average” or perhaps “median” skill.148 Compared to our judge-made
“ghost of the law,” these are objective and indeed measurable characteristics. In
what follows, we will think of our PHOSITA as a real person who has a name, a home
address, pays taxes, and goes to work most mornings. If we wanted to, we could find
her and put her on the witness stand.149
We can also generalize the concept. As Professor Suzanne Scotchmer points out,
there is no economic reason why the same PHOSITA concept should be used to define
both non-obviousness and patent breadth.150 Indeed, dividing the PHOSITA concept
into two distinct tests would solve various policy problems.151 Identifying the
PHOSITA with an actual person makes this surprisingly easy to do. Recall that
Graham defined non-obviousness in terms of a PHOSITA having “average skill in the
art,” meaning that a non-obvious invention is cleverer than fifty percent of all R&D
projects.152 In what follows we will call this threshold “PHOSITA-50,” where “50”
denotes the invention’s percentage cleverness rank compared to all other inventions
[T]he courts have defined the person of ordinary skill to be a rather extraordinary creature, an
idiot savant with extraordinary knowledge and virtually no creativity. The mind of this
hypothetical person comes equipped with a complete and thorough knowledge of all legally
pertinent prior art, far more knowledge than could be possessed by any average or actual
researcher . . . . Meanwhile, the Federal Circuit at one time described the person of ordinary
skill as someone “who thinks along the line of conventional wisdom in the art and is not one
who undertakes to innovate.”
Id.

Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg., Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[T]he
decisionmaker confronts a ghost . . . not unlike the ‘reasonable man’ and other ghosts in the law.”);
see also, Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1452, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(noting that the PHOSITA is a “hypothetical person” and “an imaginary being” of the courts’ “own
devising”) (emphasis omitted).
148 See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, supra note 28, at 713 (“The
PHOSITA standard contemplates some median or ordinary skill.”).
149 Courts sometimes recognize this possibility. Id. at 710. (“Courts have on occasion equated
the knowledge of a given individual, such as a patent examiner, with that of the PHOSITA.”).
150 See SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES, supra note 3, at 117–18.
151 Id. at 146–149; see also infra Part VII.D.
Professors Burk and Lemley note that it is
doctrinally possible to use different PHOSITA standards in different legal contexts. Burk & Lemley,
Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, supra note 28, at 712 (“The PHOSITA for purposes of
obviousness may not necessarily be the PHOSITA for purposes of enablement, written description,
definiteness, or equivalence.”).
152 Remarkably, our PHOSITA standard has a recursive quality. The cleverness it prescribes
cannot be specified in isolation and differs from market to market. To see this, suppose that a
PHOSITA-50 standard is implemented in a particular market on Day One. Rational inventors
whose inventions fall just below the threshold will immediately invest in making their products
cleverer since patentability promises a large jump in value for very little effort. Now, however, this
new investment raises the average cleverness level so that some inventions that satisfied the
PHOSITA-50 standard on Day One no longer qualify. This encourages a second round of Day Two
investments which leads to further Day Three investments and so on. The net result is that the
PHOSITA standard improves the average cleverness of all inventions, including many that are
never patented.
147

[12:644 2013] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

670

in the art. But in that case, why not generalize the concept to define additional
thresholds for, say, “PHOSITA-33” or “PHOSITA-95”? Obviously, the number of
available tests is infinite. We will use the term “PHOSITA-X” to denote this family of
standards.153
B. How Good is the Proxy?
The PHOSITA-X concept lets juries determine cleverness from the face of the
patent. The deeper question is whether cleverness is itself a proxy for R&D cost. We
argue that there are at least four good reasons to link cleverness with cost.
Brute Force Research. “Genius,” as Thomas Edison remarked, is “one percent
inspiration” and “ninety-nine percent perspiration.”154 He should know. Edison’s
search for a workable light bulb required tests of more than 3,000 filaments. 155
While cleverness may have saved him from testing even more candidates, Edison
himself was doubtful.156 Similar brute force searches are common in many modern
industries including pharmaceuticals.157
Corporate Research. Team research is inevitable in any industry– for example,
airplanes or computer software – where innovation requires more man-hours than
any human lifetime can supply. The fact that companies routinely hire R&D teams
shows that cleverness really can be bought and sold as a commodity.
Self-Employed Inventors. Many inventors who work at home could be earning
wages in commercial R&D projects. Given this opportunity cost, even garage-based
R&D programs have an implicit dollar value.
New Ideas. The link between money and innovation is thinnest when we ask
how innovators get R&D ideas in the first place. Even so, Pasteur reminds us that,

153 As before, we use “X” to denote the invention’s percentage cleverness rank compared to all
other inventions in the art.
154 Genius
is
One
Percent
Inspiration,
Ninety-Nine
Percent
Perspiration,
QUOTEINVESTIGATOR.COM (Dec. 14, 2012), http://quoteinvestigator.com/2012/12/14/genius-ratio.
155 See generally Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465, 468–69 (1895)
(discussing Thomas Edison’s incandescent lamp research).
156 As Edison later recalled:

I would construct a theory and work on its lines until I found it was untenable . . . . I
speak without exaggeration when I say that I have constructed 3,000 different theories
in connection with the electric light, each one of them reasonable and apparently likely
to be true. Yet only in two cases did my experiments prove the truth of my theory.
DANIEL STARCH, EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 377–78 (1919).
157 See Cath O’Driscoll, A Virtual Space Odyssey, NATURE 2 (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.nature
.com/horizon/chemicalspace/background/pdf/odyssey.pdf (noting that pharmaceutical companies test
roughly 5,000 candidates for each drug approved); About Asterand, ASTERAND,
http://www.asterand.com/Asterand/about/index.htm (last visited May 16, 2013) (estimating 5,00010,000 candidates per successful drug). Readers can find an extended discussion of the drug
discovery pipeline in Solomon Nwaka & Robert G. Ridley, Virtual Drug Discovery and Development
for Neglected Diseases Through Public-Private Partnerships, 2 NATURE, 919, 919 (2003).
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“[c]hance favors the prepared mind.”158 This suggests that paying people to think
about a problem can increase the supply of “prepared minds” and, implicitly, the
flow of ideas.
These observations confirm the intuition that money can induce cleverness. At
the same time the cleverness/cost link can fail. This is because some valuable ideas
really do come as “blinding flashes of inspiration” that cost nothing at all. In these
cases, our proxy will overprice R&D costs. This is a fundamental problem, though
not nearly as bad as under-rewarding R&D so that innovation never occurs at all.
Limitations. Using cleverness as a cost proxy has at least three drawbacks.
First, R&D costs vary from industry to industry. This means that the PHOSITA
standard cannot be used to compare costs across industries. Patent law has long
acknowledged this limitation.159 Second, the standard can also vary for different
types of research within the same industry. This problem is particularly noticeable
for pharmaceuticals, where costs usually increase several-fold at each step along the
R&D “pipeline.”160 Third, the PHOSITA test only provides information on relative
costs. While we know that some projects are costlier than others, we cannot say by
how much. Finally, R&D costs are unpredictable. This suggests that the ex post cost
of R&D programs may often be larger or smaller than inventors anticipate. This
should not matter in most cases. This is because innovation economics almost
always depends on ex ante incentives.
C. Uncertain Outcomes
Identifying the PHOSITA with cost is only half the battle. An economically
efficient patent law must also be flexible. In order to implement our third policy goal,
for instance, courts must be able to allocate revenue in all possible ratios, from 100:0
to 0:100. On the face of things, the patent doctrine offers just four possible outcomes:
0:0 (both patents invalid), 50:50 (both patents upheld), 100:0 (first patent valid,
second invalid), or 0:100 (first patent invalid, second valid).161 Like the proverbial
stopped clock, it seems that doctrine can only be right by accident.
Fortunately, closer inspection reveals a loophole. As Professors Mark Lemley
and Carl Shapiro have emphasized, real inventors make their investment decisions
158 Peter Buffett, Chance Favors the Prepared Mind, FORBES.COM (May 21, 2010, 2:48 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2010/05/21/life-luck-work-success-opinions-book-excerpts-peter-buffett.html.
159 Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1650. Professors Burk and Lemley said:

As the name suggests, PHOSITA-based analysis is specific to the particular art in which the
invention is made. Courts measure most significant patent law doctrines against a benchmark
that varies by industry. . . . Overwhelming evidence indicates that the application of the
PHOSITA standard varies by industry, leading for example to fewer, but broader, software
patents and more, but narrower, biotechnology patents.
Id.

160 Published estimates for each stage of the process are collected in STEPHEN M. MAURER, THE
RIGHT TOOL(S): DESIGNING COST-EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR NEGLECTED DISEASE RESEARCH,
(2005) (commissioned by WHO). See also O’Driscoll, supra note 157, at 2.
161 See discussion infra Part VI.C.
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before litigation based on “expected value.”162 In theory, at least, these probabilities
can take on any value from 1 to 100. This means that suitably chosen probabilities
can generate whatever allocations our Absolute Scope Rule requires. From an ex
ante incentives standpoint, patent law is more flexible than it looks.
How patent law uses this flexibility is another matter. Plainly, the actual
outcomes depend on doctrine. In Part VI, we show how doctrine translates the
inherent uncertainty in jurors’ PHOSITA-X determinations to allocate reward among
successive inventors.
D. Lessons for Doctrine
Any doctrine that uses the PHOSITA concept as a cost proxy is bound to make
errors. These errors can be roughly divided into (a) the way the concept is defined
and (b) its lack of predictability from one jury to the next. These simple observations
already provide useful insights for doctrine.
Definitional Limits. There are many things that the PHOSITA concept cannot
do even in principle. We have argued that sequential innovation is most efficient
under an Absolute Scope Rule where each inventor (a) retains enough revenue to
cover her actual R&D cost, and then (b) pays any excess to her immediate
predecessor. But a jury’s PHOSITA-X determination does not measure actual R&D
costs. It only provides a relative judgment that some inventions are cleverer—and,
implicitly, more expensive to develop—than others. It follows that no PHOSITA
based doctrine can ever say when a particular inventor has covered her costs and
should transfer any remaining revenue upstream. This limitation deters investment
by increasing the odds that at least one inventor will fail to recover her costs. For
this reason, PHOSITA-based incentives can never be as efficient as our ideal
Absolute Scope Rule.
Uncertainty. Lawyers are trained to seek clear and replicable rules. However,
we have argued that the PHOSITA proxy works best when jury determinations are
uncertain. This is obviously troubling. At the same time, we should also know when
to admit defeat. The Federal Circuit has tried and failed to make patent outcomes
predictable for over thirty years now.163 In these circumstances, it may be wiser to
admit that the problem will never be solved and look for silver linings.
The good news is that unpredictability has only a minor impact on economic
efficiency. If investors are risk-neutral,164 incentives only depend on average
162 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 77–78 (2005).
Professors Green and Scotchmer also examine models in which patent validity is probabilistic.
Green & Scotchmer, supra note 62, at 22–32. The main difference is that their model focuses on
uncertainty in R&D outcomes rather than litigation. Id.
163 See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Mayer, J.,
dissenting). As Judges Mayer and Newman protested, “In the name of uniformity, [we have] held
that claim construction does not involve subsidiary or underlying questions of fact . . . . What we
have wrought, instead, is the substitution of a black box, as it so pejoratively has been said of the
jury, with the black hole of this court.” Id.
164 Rebecca S. Rudnick, Enforcing the Fundamental Premises of Partnership Taxation, 22
HOFSTRA L. REV. 229, 284 (1993) (“Risk neutrality is the condition where, given the choice of a
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expected reward. If investors are risk averse, on the other hand, they can readily
manage the problem by investing in so many companies (and implicitly, patent
portfolios) that any fluctuations cancel.
The main costs of uncertainty involve individual justice, i.e. the certainty that
some inventors will receive windfalls while others are penalized. Still, even this
objection is weaker than it sounds. First, everyone knows that lawsuits are
uncertain, and patent owners necessarily accept this risk. 165 Second, we have
already said that investors can defend themselves by diversifying. Finally, the actual
number of cases that go to trial in any well-functioning system is small.166 This
means that most rewards will be paid in the form of licensing fees rather than court
judgments. Theory suggests that most of these payouts will cluster somewhere near
the average litigated outcome.167
Reforming Doctrine. This Section began by remarking that the PHOSITA
doctrine is considerably more complicated than our simple PHOSITA-X discussion
suggests. Some of these additional rules are designed to make the jury inquiry more
routinized and predictable168 and would presumably improve our proxy. However, we
have also seen that the PHOSITA doctrine has become encrusted with “reasonable
man”-type requirements that have nothing to do with actual inventors. Judges who
take our arguments seriously should want to clear away this underbrush.
In the meantime, the PHOSITA standard continues to evolve. By far the most
important development in recent years has been the Supreme Court’s KSR decision,
which adds “ordinary creativity” to the PHOSITA’s attributes.169 Previously, the
PHOSITA had been more or less incapable of having new ideas. Instead, she was
limited to teachings, suggestions, or motivations (“TSM”) that already existed—and
could be documented—in the prior art.170 The KSR decision expanded the TSM
universe to include trivial ideas that no one had previously bothered to articulate. 171
This gave defendants many more chances to assert obviousness.172
certain return of $100, and an investment which has a 50 percent probability of a return of $200, a
risk neutral investor would be indifferent.”).
165 See, e.g., Patent Litigation-Risks and Rewards, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 25, 2010),
http://www.natlawreview.com/printpdf/2900.
166 Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How are Patent Cases Resolved?
An Empirical
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 244–
45 (2006).
167 Theorists traditionally assume that parties who know the likely litigation outcome will
settle to avoid unnecessary transactions costs. The range of bargained outcomes depends on the size
of those costs. The theory is potentially testable because it predicts that the parties will only litigate
close questions. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 26 (1984). Unfortunately, the prediction is highly fact-dependent and may not hold
in practice. See Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 187–88 (1993); Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory
at Trial is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493, 494 (1996).
168 For a comprehensive survey, see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330–35 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (en banc) (Mayer, J., dissenting).
169 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
170 Id. at 399.
171 Id. at 400–04.
172 See, e.g., Amy L. Landers, Ordinary Creativity in Patent Law:
The Artist Within the
Scientist, 75 MO. L. REV. 1, 73 (2010); Andrew B. Dzeguze, The Devil in the Details: A Critique of
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The Supreme Court justified the PHOSITA’s new attribute based on our first
policy goal of declining to reward inventions that would arrive anyhow “in the
ordinary course,” of events.173 Our economic analysis confirms and clarifies this
argument. We have already argued that the Graham test is best understood as a
proxy for the inventor’s R&D costs, and that creative ideas are often less costly than
other R&D inputs.174 But this leads to an obvious problem: if the optimal threshold
for average research inputs is PHOSITA-50, then the test for unusually cheap inputs,
ideas, must be higher, for example, PHOSITA-70 or PHOSITA-80. The problem with
the old TSM rule is that it was inconsistent in the wrong direction, if an idea could
not be found in the prior art, it was automatically deemed creative. This implied
something like a PHOSITA-0 standard for creativity. Whatever its flaws, KSR has
almost certainly made the PHOSITA a better cost proxy.
V. HOW DOCTRINE ALLOCATES REWARD (A): LITERAL INFRINGEMENT AND BLOCKING
PATENTS
We have argued that the PHOSITA concept supplies a reasonable proxy for R&D
costs. However, doctrine must still provide rules that translate jurors’ PHOSITA
determinations into expected rewards for 1G and 2G inventors. U.S. patent law
currently does this through a two-step process. First, the jury must find that the 1G
patent is valid, i.e. satisfies Graham’s “non-obviousness” test.175 Second, the jury
must find that the 2G invention infringes, i.e. falls within the 1G patent’s “breadth.”
Strangely, this second inquiry is governed by two separate sets of rules – “Literal
Infringement”176 and the “Doctrine of Equivalents.”177 This Section analyzes the
simplest Literal Infringement case. This typically occurs where the 1G patent
literally describes all or part of the 2G invention. We discuss more complex doctrinal
problems involving non-literal infringement and affirmative defenses in Parts VII
and VIII.

KSR’s Unwarranted Reinterpretation of “Person Having Ordinary Skill,” 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 1, 46–48 (2009). Dzeguze objects that “creativity” and “skill in the art” are two distinct
concepts, so that a mechanic could easily possess the latter while lacking the former. Id. The
present article solves this difficulty by identifying the PHOSITA with actual inventors. Indeed,
requiring both “average creativity” and “average skill” is no more inconsistent than asking what a
person of “average height and weight” looks like.
173 KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
174 See supra Part V.B.
175 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
176 Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (Literal infringement occurs when
“all claim limitations are present in the accused device exactly [so that the] claims ‘read on’ the
accused device.”).
177 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002) (“The scope
of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead embraces all equivalents to the claims
described”); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 35 (1997).
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A. Literal Infringement and Blocking Patents
The boundary between Literal Infringement and the Doctrine of Equivalents
runs like a fissure through patent doctrine. 178 As the Supreme Court’s Graver Tank
decision explains, “resort must be had in the first instance to the words of the claim.
If accused matter falls clearly within the claim, infringement is made out and that is
the end of it.”179 This process necessarily excludes any opportunity to present
evidence of the 2G invention’s cleverness.180
Literal Infringement frequently leads to “Blocking Patent” scenarios in which
anyone practicing the 2G invention must obtain licenses from both the 1G and 2G
patent owners.181 Blocking Patents occur whenever both inventions are patentable
and the second patent “includes the first.”182 This usually involves situations where
the 1G and 2G inventions are both patentable and a complete description of the 2G
invention includes (a) all of the underlying 1G invention’s original claims elements,
and (b) additional claims elements supplied by the 2G inventor. 183 Conversely, 2G
inventions that modify one or more elements of the 1G patent escape literal
infringement and are analyzed under the Doctrine of Equivalents. 184
B. What Incentives Do Investors See?
We now ask how the Graham standard allocates patent revenue between
successive innovators. This Section introduces the basic logic by analyzing a simple
scenario in which a 2G inventor patents improvements to a previously patented 1G
178 See generally 5B CHISUM, supra note 113, § 18.04[4][a] (“Federal Circuit [cases] regularly
refer to ‘literal infringement’ as one of the two species of infringement, the other being infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents.”).
179 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
180 For example, evidence showing that the 2G invention has received a patent is inadmissible
in literal infringement cases. See, for example, 5B CHISUM, supra note 113, § 18 and cases cited
therein.
181 Robert P. Merges, Brief Note on Blocking Patents and Reverse Equivalents: Biotechnology
as an Example, A, 73 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 878, 878–79 (1991).
182 Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U.S. 689, 694 (1886).
183 Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(“[I]f Atlas patents A + B + C and Du Pont then patents the improvement A + B + C + D, Du Pont is
liable to Atlas for any manufacture, use, or sale of A + B + C + D.”). Chisum similarly explains:

The patentability of an accused product or process often stems from what may be
characterized as an additive or selective improvement, adding elements, features, or functions
to the earlier patented invention or discovering preferred species for generic elements in the
earlier invention, rather than from a mere substitution of one element for another. In such
cases, Federal Circuit decisions recognize that an accused product or process does not avoid
infringement by adding functions or features if it contains literally or by equivalents all the
elements of patent claim in question.
Donald S. Chisum, The Scope of Protection for Patents After the Supreme Court’s Warner-Jenkinson
Decision: Fair Protection--Certainty Conundrum, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1,
36 (1998).
184 Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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technology. For simplicity, we assume that the 1G product is pre-commercial and
earns no revenue. The 1G inventor sues for infringement and each party argues that
the other’s patent is invalid under Graham’s non-obviousness test.
Analysis. We begin by reviewing the possible legal outcomes. The Graham
“non-obviousness” test tells juries to (a) determine each invention’s PHOSITA-X
rank, and (b) invalidate patents that do not exceed PHOSITA-50. Because invalid
patents receive nothing, our hypothetical lawsuit can end in 0:0, 100:0, and 0:100
allocations.185 If both patents are upheld, our blocking patents assumption produces
50:50 sharing.
In order to decide the case, the jury must determine PHOSITA-X values for both
the 1G and 2G patents. We start with the 1G patent. In theory, at least, we can
imagine empaneling 1,000 different juries to determine the 1G patent’s PHOSITA-X
value. Suppose that we do this and the resulting verdicts have, say, a mean of fiftyfive. Since all 1,000 juries have seen the same evidence and received the same
instructions, it is reasonable to think that most juries will reach similar results. This
suggests that juries will pick rankings close to fifty-five (e.g. fifty-eight) more often
than distant ones (e.g. seventy-five). The solid line in Figure 1 depicts a typical
example of this “verdict distribution.” Loosely speaking, readers can think of the
vertical axis as showing the probability that a jury will determine each rank from 1
to 100. 186
FIGURE 1

185 An invention which is obvious cannot be patented and therefore receives no revenue. In our
0:0 case both patents are obvious and invalid and therefore receive nothing. Our 100:0 and 0:100
cases occur when only one of the two patents is obvious and invalid.
186 Mathematically-inclined readers will recognize that one cannot really speak of “the
probability of x” for continuous values. Properly speaking, Fig. 1 depicts a “probability density.”
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Different inventions will usually have different verdict distributions. 187 How
does this affect the allocation of reward? We know that the expected allocation is
determined by the ratio of how often the 1G invention is upheld to how often the 2G
invention is upheld. Geometrically, this corresponds to how much of the area under
each verdict distribution falls to the right of Graham’s PHOSITA-50 standard. On
the other hand, a PHOSITA-60 invention (Figure 1, dashed line) will usually have
more area to the right of the PHOSITA-50 threshold than a PHOSITA-55 invention
(Figure 1, solid line). More clever inventions will therefore be upheld more often, and
have greater expected value, than less clever ones. This is encouraging.
As usual, the devil is in the details. Ideally, we would like to use our verdict
distributions to allocate reward according to cost.188 But this requires proportionality
so that a one percent increase in cleverness improves an invention’s chances of
receiving revenue by roughly one percent. In practice, this ideal is never reached. A
glance at Figure 1 shows why. Our example started with a verdict distribution that
peaked near Graham’s PHOSITA-50 threshold standard. Because the distribution is
so tall at this point, even a slight increase in cleverness drags a large slice of area
into the right hand side. In this situation, the patent system tends to over-reward
small cleverness increments. On the other hand, suppose that distribution’s peak is
far to the right of the threshold. Here, a one percent increase in cleverness generates
too little expected reward. Figure 2 depicts the extreme case where both inventions
are extremely clever. Here, the chances that the jury’s PHOSITA-X determination
will be less than fifty are already tiny. For this reason, further increases in
cleverness have almost no impact on expected revenue. Instead, our 50:50 blocking
patents default rule dictates the allocation.

If our legal rules were completely determinate, all 1,000 juries would return a verdict of 55.
In this case, Figure 1 would show an infinitely narrow verdict distribution, i.e., a vertical line. More
realistically, we expect real verdicts to contain a random component as well. Where this component
is small, we expect juries to deliver “mostly determinate” verdicts. This will produce narrow verdict
distributions with high peaks. Where the random component is larger, we expect verdict
distributions to be broader and flatter.
188 We have already said that this prescription follows the neoclassical economics literature. It
is worth noting, however, that some legal scholars suggest that reward should reflect value to
consumers. See, e.g., Amy L. Landers, Patent Claim Apportionment, Patentee Injury, and Sequential
Invention, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471, 472 (2012). For them, tying reward allocation to the
PHOSITA cost proxy is a disaster. The problem could presumably be fixed by replacing Graham’s
PHOSITA with an “Ordinary Consumer” who defines average utility. U.S. law has repeatedly
rejected such proposals. Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, supra note 108, at 1236–37.
187
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FIGURE 2

For convenience, we will refer to regions close to the PHOSITA-50 as the
“Allocation Zone” in what follows. Conversely, we will refer to regions dominated by
the 50:50 rule as the “Default Zone.”
Putting these results together, we distinguish several cases. First, both patents
may fall inside the Allocation Zone. Here, the expected allocations really do depend
on comparative cleverness. Second, both patents may fall far to the right of the
PHOSITA-50 threshold. Within this Default Zone, we expect a Blocking Patents
Rule to enforce 50:50 sharing even when one patent is significantly cleverer than the
other. Finally, readers should consider the case (not shown) where one patent falls in
the Default Zone and the other falls inside the Allocation Zone. In this case, the final
result will depend almost entirely on small differences in the Allocation Zone patent’s
cleverness while ignoring similar nuances in the Default Zone patent.
Finally, we have drawn Figs. 1 and 2 so that they feature narrow verdict
distributions with high, sharp peaks.
For large uncertainties, the verdict
distributions become so broad that the Default Zone disappears entirely.
C. Which World Do We Live In?
Our argument suggests that—far from being a flaw—litigation uncertainty is
not necessarily a flaw because it provides an essential bridge between patent law’s
formal winner-take-all outcomes and the need for practical incentives that promise
adequate reward to each inventor in the R&D chain. Clearly, much depends on the
shape of the verdict distributions. If they are broad, we should expect large
Allocation Zones.189 In this case, the Graham non-obviousness standard can be

189

Supra Part VI.B.
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trusted to link expected rewards to relative R&D costs for most inventions190 so that
Graham’s basic PHOSITA standard provides reasonable allocations. Conversely,
narrow distributions imply large Default Zones.191 In this situation, the Graham
standard often functions poorly by producing 50:50 allocations when one invention is
markedly cleverer than the other.192 Here, legislators and judges will often decide
that it is better to create additional Allocation Zones which reduce or eliminate the
number of default outcomes. This typically involves adopting affirmative defenses
that implement additional PHOSITA-X tests for highly clever inventions.193
Which world do we actually live in? In principle, the verdict distribution can be
measured. For example, scholars could play the same videotaped patent trial to 100
average Americans and ask them to deliver verdicts. This experiment, of course, has
never been done. Still, we can guess what the verdicts would be. Given that we are
all prospective jurors, this might involve little more than asking readers how
consistently they could detect the difference between, say, a PHOSITA-75 invention
and its PHOSITA-50 counterpart.
In what follows, we will assume moderate verdict distributions that leave
substantial Default Zones. This provides a strong argument for creating affirmative
defenses that invite juries to conduct additional comparative cleverness
determinations far from PHOSITA-50.
D. Implications for Doctrine
Our Literal Infringement example is a special case. Nonetheless, it contains
important lessons for doctrine. First, it reminds us of unintended consequences.
Recall that the Supreme Court invented the Graham standard to address our first
policy goal, i.e., screen out inventions that are not worth the “embarrassment of an
exclusive patent.”194 In the process, however, the Court inadvertently created a
process for allocating reward among successive inventors.
Though facially
reasonable, this rule falls short of our benchmark Absolute Scope rule. We will see
that this defect can be ameliorated—though not eliminated—by grafting additional
PHOSITA-X inquiries onto the doctrine.
Finally, we have so far assumed that litigation is a single one-shot event. But
many patents face multiple litigations. 195 Under principles of collateral estoppel this
means that a patent which fails to establish Graham non-obviousness in, for
example, the third litigation will lose every subsequent lawsuit.196 More generally,
patent owners facing multiple litigations will receive systematically less expected
income than they would if their claims were tried in a single action. It is difficult to
see how this problem can be solved short of abolishing collateral estoppel altogether.
See supra Part VI.B.
See supra Part VI.B.
192 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
193 Infra Part VIII.
194 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1966).
195 See, e.g., Collateral Estoppel Bars UpJohn’s Patent Suit, 14 ANDREWS PHARMACEUTICAL
LITIG. REP. 15, 15 (1999) (Upjohn patent faced two earlier lawsuits).
196 See id. (invoking collateral estoppel to bar re-litigation of validity issues).
190
191
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VI. HOW DOCTRINE ALLOCATES REWARD (B): THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
Blocking Patents do a surprisingly good job of allocating reward among
successive inventors. If our third policy goal were the only one, we would expect the
same 50:50 rule to operate throughout patent law. However, we must also consider
our second goal. It insists that the 1G patent monopoly should have limited duration
and breadth. This implies that sufficiently clever 2G inventors should sometimes be
allowed to build on 1G insights and still escape infringement.
This Section extends our probabilistic patents analysis to include the Doctrine of
Equivalents. Part VII.A sets the stage by reviewing the sometimes incoherent case
law that surrounds the Doctrine of Equivalents. We argue that attempts to
rationalize the Doctrine will almost certainly require juries to assess the 2G
invention’s cleverness.
Part VII.B analyzes how a rationalized Doctrine of
Equivalents would allocate reward for different 2G cleverness standards.
Significantly, we find that very strong versions of the Doctrine of Equivalents
approximate our Blocking Patents rule. Part VII.C concludes by discussing the
prospects for combining Literal Infringement and the Doctrine of Equivalents into a
single unified doctrine.
A. The Doctrine of Equivalents
The Doctrine of Equivalents was originally designed to prevent copyists from
using trivial changes to evade verbal “metes and bounds” descriptions of the patent
monopoly.197 This eventually led to a “Function-Way-Result” Test which asked
whether the accused device “perform [sic] substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result.”198 But how
should judges define “substantially”? If the answer is more than de minimis, then
any changes beyond trivial and calculated evasion should escape infringement.
Precedents that describe the Doctrine of Equivalents as a deterrent against
“pirating,” “mere imitation,” “insubstantiality,”199 “minor variations,” and
“unimportant and insubstantial changes”200 tend to reinforce this view. More
recently, however, the Supreme Court has emphasized that this doctrine is not
limited to cases of copying and piracy but instead defines “the notion of identity
between a patented invention and its equivalent.” 201 This seems to recognize
expansive, although sometimes vague, judicial statements that 2G inventors cannot
escape so long as “the gist” of their invention is the same and there are no
197 See Kenneth D. Bassinger, Unsettled Expectations in Patent Law: Festo and the Moving
Target of Claim Equivalence, 48 HOW. L.J. 685, 691 (2005) (“Recognizing that language is often a
dull instrument with which to define the intellectual nuances of an invention, the courts created the
doctrine of equivalents to provide an escape from the confines of the restrictive literalism of claim
language.”).
198 Id. at 694.
199 Bassinger, supra note 197, at 691, 695.
200 Alan L. Durham, “Patent Symmetry,” 87 B.U.L. REV. 969, 1004-05 (2007).201 Warner
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 34–35 (1997).
201 Warner Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 34–35 (1997).
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“unexpected or substantially different results.”.202 These standards bring the
Doctrine of Equivalents much closer to innovation theory’s familiar concept of patent
breadth.
That said, the content of words like “equivalent” and “gist” is elusive.
Historically, most efforts to clarify the Doctrine of Equivalents have involved
arguments that modifications which use an “interchangeable” element cannot be
substantial and are therefore equivalent.203 “Interchangeability,” in turn, is almost
always framed in terms of the expectations of a skilled artisan.204 This implies a
cleverness test and bears an obvious resemblance to Graham’s PHOSITA standard.
At the same time, the “skilled artisan” phraseology predates and remains distinct
from the usual formula of a “Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art.” Maddeningly,
the nature of these differences is obscure. On the one hand, assertions that the
notional artisan must have “reasonable skill” hint that the Doctrine of Equivalents’
cleverness threshold could be lower than the PHOSITA’s “average” or “ordinary”
test.205 On the other hand, statements that the “advancement” must be more than
“routine”206 point in the opposite direction.
Suggestions for reforming the Doctrine of Equivalents usually fall into three
categories. 207 The first would leave the Function-Way-Result Test unchanged but
demand more explicit argument and evidence.208 This would presumably weaken the
Doctrine while avoiding any policy discussion of what patent breadth is or ought to

202

1984).

See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1580 n.3 (Fed. Cir.

203 Frustratingly, the test is not absolute. See, e.g., Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v.
Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Moreover, a finding of known
interchangeability, while an important factor in determining equivalence, is certainly not
dispositive.”); see also Hon. Paul R. Michel, The Role and Responsibility of Patent Attorneys in
Improving the Doctrine of Equivalents, 40 IDEA 123, 128 (2000) (remarking that “known
interchangeability” is currently a mere factor instead of “a true test”).
204 There are several cases that invoke the concept of a skilled artisan without using the
traditional “Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art” standard. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609 (“An
important factor is whether a person reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the
interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was.”); Interactive
Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he known
interchangeability test looks to the knowledge of a skilled artisan to see whether that artisan would
contemplate the interchange as a design choice.”). Commentators routinely paraphrase these cases
as invoking a PHOSITA standard. See, e.g., Bassinger, supra note 197, at 695. Durham notes that
the Supreme Court has variously invoked “persons skilled in the art” and “skilled practitioners” and
also asked whether the 2G substitution was “routine” or else required “a further advancement in the
art.” Durham, supra note 200, at 1011–12.
205 See Durham, supra note 200, at 1011.
206 Id.
207 See Michel, supra note 203, at 124–25; see also M. Scott Boone, Defining and Refining the
Doctrine of Equivalents: Notice and Prior Art, Language and Fraud, 43 IDEA 645, 646 (2003).
208 See Michel, supra note 203, at 129. According to Judge Michel, the approach would build on
Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (criticizing “offhand and
conclusory statements” that left jury “to its own imagination on the technical issue of equivalency”)
and Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co. of Mich., Inc., 873 F.2d 1422, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(stating that the jury must receive “particularized testimony and linking argument” for each
element of the Triple Identity Test).
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be.209 The second proposal would expand “known interchangeability” into a “true
test.”210 While the details of this proposal are obscure, it is reasonable to think that
the word “known” would continue to be measured by the awareness of skilled
artisans. This clearly implies a PHOSITA-X threshold test, though not necessarily a
PHOSITA-50 test. The final and arguably most popular suggestion would be to
identify breadth with Graham’s non-obviousness standard. This approach is already
widely used overseas,211 and has been endorsed by various U.S. commentators212 and
judges.213
As the late Judge Nies argued in a celebrated concurrence, “[a]
substitution in a patented invention cannot be both nonobvious and insubstantial.” 214
Significantly, Judge Nies may not have realized that Graham’s PHOSITA-50
standard is just one choice among many. In fact, her argument applies to any
PHOSITA-X value greater than PHOSITA-50.215
B. Analysis
Given these uncertain precedents, it is hard to predict how judges will
ultimately reform and clarify the Doctrine of Equivalents. At the same time,
practically all courts invoke PHOSITA-like cleverness judgments. No reform is likely
to change this. The only question is whether the corresponding PHOSITA-X
threshold will be large or small. This section examines how the various possible
choices change reward allocations compared to Graham’s baseline non-obviousness
test.
We begin by reminding the reader of our Literal Infringement/Blocking Patents
analysis. In that case, doctrine asked juries whether the 1G and 2G patents were
non-obvious. This meant that both patents were compared against the same
PHOSITA-50 standard and, through that standard, each other. The Doctrine of
Equivalents adds a second test over and above the basic Graham non-obviousness
inquiry. Now, jurors must also compare the 2G invention’s cleverness against the 1G
patent’s breadth. Doctrinally, this second breadth threshold can potentially take on
any PHOSITA-X value from 1 to 100. For reasons that appear below, it is enough to
consider two examples.
Narrow Breadth. Figure 3 shows how much reward the 2G invention receives
where breadth is defined by a PHOSITA-25 standard. Unlike previous Figures, we
plot the 2G invention’s cleverness against its expected allocation share. For clarity,
More explicit evidence and argument by counsel might, of course, lead to clearer judicial
decisions.
210 Michel, supra note 203, at 129; see also Boone, supra note 207, at 654.
211 See Mark D. Janis, Who’s Afraid of Functional Claims? Reforming the Patent Law’s § 112,
¶ 6 Jurisprudence, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 231, 267 (1999).
212 See Durham, supra note 200, at 982; Scott P. Zimmerman, The Doctrine of Equivalents: A
Call for Congressional Reinvigoration, 40 IDEA 599, 623 (2000); Michael T. Siekman, The Expanded
Hypothetical Claim Test: A Better Test for Infringement for Biotechnology Patents Under the
Doctrine of Equivalents, 2 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 6, 10 (1996).
213 See Michel, supra note 203, at 128–29; Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112,
1128 (Fed Cir. 1996) (Nies, J., concurring).
214 Roton Barrier, 79 F.3d at 1128.
215 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
209
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the Figure illustrates the specific case in which the 1G invention’s verdict
distribution peaks at PHOSITA-50.
We start on the far left-hand side. For very low cleverness inventions the 2G
patent has almost no chance of exceeding the PHOSITA-25 threshold. For this
reason, it earns nothing in expectation. This leads to a 100:0 Default Zone.216 Now
examine the far right-hand side. Here, inventions that are significantly cleverer
than PHOSITA-25 escape the 1G patent and pay nothing. This implements our
second policy goal but also leads to very extreme 0:100 allocations that fail to reflect
the parties’ relative R&D costs. This region is shown as the “0:100 Default Zone” in
Figure 3.
FIGURE 3

Finally, consider the middle region near PHOSITA-25. Unlike our blocking
patents case, the 1G patent is measured against Graham’s PHOSITA-50 standard
while the 2G patent is measured against our PHOSITA-25 breadth definition. This
distorts the calculation so that the 2G inventor receives roughly three times as much
for her cleverness as the 1G inventor.217 This allocation can only be right for rare
cases where R&D costs rise steeply at each successive development step.

216 The label is a matter of convenience. Because the 1G patent has a 50 percent chance of
failing the non-obviousness test, 0:0 outcomes are equally likely.
217 To see this, consider the case where the 1G invention’s verdict distribution peaks at
PHOSITA-50 and the 2G curve peaks at PHOSITA-25. Then we expect the 1G patent to be upheld
50% of the time. Even in these cases, however, there is still a 50% chance that the 2G invention will
exceed PHOSITA-25 and escape infringement. We therefore expect the final allocation to be 25:75
on average.
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So far, we have assumed that the 1G invention’s verdict distribution peaks at
PHOSITA-50. If the 1G patent is significantly cleverer than the Graham nonobviousness juries will almost certainly find it valid. In this case, the 2G invention’s
expected allocation share will be smaller at each point in Figure 3. Similarly, less
clever 1G invention will produce higher 2G rewards.
High PHOSITA-X. We now consider the opposite case in which most follow-on
inventions infringe the 1G patent. Figure 4 depicts this situation for the PHOSITA75 case. As in Figure 3, Figure 4 depicts the specific case where the 1G invention’s
verdict distribution peaks at PHOSITA-50.
Not surprisingly, everything to the left of the PHOSITA-75 standard resembles
our Blocking Patent analysis in Part VI. We start by examining the left-hand side
where the 2G invention is markedly less clever than the PHOSITA-50 threshold
needed to create a blocking patent. Since the 2G invention receives nothing this
produces a “100:0 Default Zone” in the figure. Now consider the region near the
center of the Figure (Allocation Zone A) where the 2G invention is close to PHOSITA50. Here, revenue is allocated in proportion to relative cleverness. There is also a
second, 50:50 Default Zone for 2G inventions whose verdict distributions fall in the
broad middle region between PHOSITA-50 and PHOSITA-75.218
FIGURE 4

218 The zone disappears in the special case where breath and non-obviousness standards are
identical. As Professor Adams remarks, combining the two standards sets up a syllogism. Charles
W. Adams, Allocating Patent Rights Between Earlier and Later Inventions, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 55,
60 (2009). If the 1G patent would enable a PHOSITA to make the 2G invention, the latter falls
within the 1G patent and should not be patentable. But if the 1G patent does not enable a
PHOSITA to make the 2G invention, the latter is patentable and falls outside the 1G patent’s
breadth. This may explain why most blocking patent cases involve Literal Infringement and not the
Doctrine of Equivalents.
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Finally, the regions on the right resemble our Low Breadth case. These include
a probabilistic region (“Allocation B”) near the PHOSITA-75 threshold that defines
non-infringing 2G improvements and a 0:100 region for ultra-clever 2G inventions.
As before, making the 1G invention cleverer reduces the 2G invention’s expected
allocation at each point in the figure.
Putting these observations together, we see that everything to the left of the
PHOSITA-75 threshold replicates our “Blocking Patents” allocation rule. For infinite
(PHOSITA-100) breadth Literal Infringement and the Doctrine of Equivalents
produce identical results.
C. Lessons for Doctrine
The deep divide between Literal Infringement and The Doctrine of Equivalents
outcomes is puzzling. Certainly, nothing in innovation economics suggests that
inventors who add new elements require fewer incentives than those who rethink
existing ones. But this leaves us with an uncomfortable choice. Either the two rules
share some underlying unity, or one must surely wrong.
The fact that large PHOSITA-X versions of the Doctrine of Equivalents produce
much the same allocation outcomes as Literal Infringement provides an important
clue. If the two doctrines really do converge, the difference may be less about
substance than judicial economy. After all, cleverness inquiries require expensive
jury determinations. But how clever can a 2G invention be if it fails to escape the 1G
patent’s literal claims language? Judges could well decide that it is better to outlaw
cleverness inquiries in Literal Infringement cases altogether. Like all bright line
rules, this is bound to produce mistakes. Indeed, Part VIII.A will discuss one such
example at length. Still, this may not matter much if defenses like the “Reverse
Doctrine of Equivalents” provide a safety valve for radically clever improvements. 219
The doctrinal fissure is harder to rationalize for low PHOSITA-X versions of the
Doctrine of Equivalents. Here, Literal Infringement really does produce markedly
different outcomes. In theory, Congress could re-unify doctrine by abolishing Literal
Infringement and mandating a single Doctrine of Equivalents test for all patent
disputes. But in that case, what PHOSITA-X value should Congress use to define
breadth? In an ideal world, legislators could estimate the optimal PHOSITA-X
thresholds for our second and our third goals separately and split the difference. In
reality, this procedure would consist mostly of guesswork.
VII. HOW DOCTRINE ALLOCATES REWARD (C): DEFENSES
We saw in Part VI that any patent doctrine based on the Graham’s PHOSITA
test automatically establishes baseline rules for allocating reward among inventors.
But we also showed that these results could be improved by adopting doctrinal
architectures that invite juries to make additional inquiries. This Section reviews

219

See infra Part VIII.A.
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various infringement defenses that have been proposed over the years and compares
their potential for improving Graham’s baseline allocation rule.
We begin by reviewing the often controversial defenses that courts have
developed to address multi-inventor issues. These include the Reverse Doctrine of
Equivalents (Part VIIIA), the Pioneer Patents Doctrine (Part VIII.B) and the Written
Description Requirement (Part VIII.C). We then compare these doctrines against our
third goal.
A. Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents
The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents was introduced more than 100 years ago 220
and remains (apparently221) good law today. However, it is expressly limited to
literal infringement cases222 and is seldom applied.223 Despite this, it remains

Boyden Power Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898).
The Westinghouse rule languished for over half a century before the Supreme Court revived
it in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., Inc., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). Thereafter, it
remained uncontroversial, if seldom used, for another fifty years. This changed in 2002 when the
Federal Circuit suggested that the Graver Tank holding had been superseded by 35 U.S.C § 112
(2012). If so, the reverse doctrine could no longer be invoked to constrict the “literal language when
it is clearly claimed.” Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002). However, this argument has been widely criticized. Mark A. Lemley, The
Changing Meaning of Patent Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101, 104 (2005) (arguing that Reverse
Doctrine of Equivalents is distinct from written description because it is measured at the time of
infringement rather than filing); Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Conflicting Theories of Equivalence: 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, ¶ 6 in the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, 40 IDEA 163, 193–94 (2000). But see
Martin J. Adelman & Gary L Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions that
Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 724 n.221 (1989) (Section 112 “should be viewed
as a legislative codification of the reverse doctrine of equivalents.”). Moreover, more recent Federal
Circuit decisions continue to mention the defense. See Biogen, Inc. v. Berlex Labs, Inc., 318 F.3d
1132, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335,
1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2003); DePuy Spine, Inc. v Medtonic Sofamor Daenk, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1338–39 (Fed Cir.
2009) (“The Supreme Court has recognized it to be a viable defense, even if it is rarely asserted.”).
222 Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 846 F.2d 1369, 1371 (Fed Cir. 1988). We
will see that the Pioneer Patents doctrine provides similar rules in Doctrine of Equivalents cases.
223 But see Gardner v. Ford Motor Co., No. C85-711WD, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21052, at *31–
35 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (finding that the second invention was far removed from the “principle,
structure, and operation” of claimed invention); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum, Co., 865 F.2d
1247, 1253 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Am. Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 86, 104 (D. Del.
1989) (endorsing “principle”-based test and criticizing tests based on whether invention functions “in
a substantially different way”); Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878,
889 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding that the defendant could establish non-infringement by showing that
his device performs a similar function in a substantially different way); Precision Metal Fabricators
Inc. v. Jetstream Sys. Co., 693 F. Supp. 814, 819 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that infringement did not
occur where defendant’s machines did “not operate on the same principle” and “[w]hatever
similarities exist are incidental and do not enhance the operation of defendants' machines”);
Leesona Corp. v. United States, 530 F.2d 896, 906 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (“It is well settled that more than a
literal response to the terms of the claims must be shown to make out a case of infringement.”).
220
221
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surprisingly popular among scholars. 224 This suggests that it could be readily
revived given a clear policy reason to do so.
Strangely, most of what we know about the Doctrine still comes from the
original Westinghouse opinion. The case involves – and describes in prolix, obsessive
detail – air brakes for trains.225 Westinghouse had developed a system in which each
car’s brakes were driven by a local tank which was, in turn, pressurized and
controlled by lines from the locomotive.226 This required an elaborate system of
“triple” and “auxiliary valves.”227 Boyden invented a new triple valve that made the
auxiliary valves unnecessary. Despite remarkable cleverness, however, the new
arrangement still fell within the literal language of Westinghouse’s patent. 228 This
might have encouraged the Court to declare a blocking patent. In fact, the Court
went much further by declaring that Boyden’s invention had “so far changed the
principle of the device that the claims of the patent, literally construed, have ceased
to represent his actual invention.”229 Left unsaid was how much change would be
required to trigger the defense. Most modern scholarship230 states that the change
224 Extended discussions and proposed extensions of the doctrine can be found in, inter alia, R.
Scott Roe, Nanotechnology: When Making Something Smaller is Nonobvious, 12 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 127 (2006); Carrier, supra note 35, at 118; Christopher D. Hazuka, Supporting the Work of
Lesser Geniuses: An Argument for Removing Obstructions to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research,
57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 157, 157 (2002); Anand Gupta, Patent Law: The Supreme Court Reinforces the
Validity of the Doctrine of Equivalents in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,” 23 S.
ILL. U. L. J. 123, 123 (1998); Lemley, Improvement in IP, supra note 87, at 1010–13; Robert P.
Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62
TENN. L. REV. 75, 101–03 (1994); Michael S. Greenfield, Recombinant DNA Technology: A Science
Struggling with the Patent Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1992); Laura A. Handley, Refining the
Graver Tank Analysis With Hypothetical Claims: A Biotechnology Exemplar, 5 HARV. J. LAW &
TECH. 31, 31 (1991).
225 Boyden Power Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 537–39 (1898).
226 Id. at 545.
227 Id. at 553, 558–59.
228 Id. at 571–73.
229 Id. at 568, 572. The Supreme Court famously reaffirmed the rule in 1950:

Thus, where a device is so far changed in principle from a patented article that it
performs the same or a similar function in a substantially different way, but
nevertheless falls within the literal words of the claim, the doctrine of equivalents may
be used to restrict the claim and defeat the patentee’s action for infringement.
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608–09 (1950).
230 Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 175,
185–86 (2011) (noting that radical improvements may avoid liability under literal infringement);
Roe, supra note 224, at 141 (Doctrine prevents 1G patent owners from stifling “radical
improvements.”); Simone A. Rose, On Purple Pills, Stem Cells, and Other Market Failures: A Case
for a Limited Compulsory Licensing Scheme for Patent Property, 48 HOW. L.J. 579, 584 (2005)
(“Moreover, the reverse doctrine of equivalents allows for infringing acts, which produce radically
pioneering inventions”); Hazuka, supra note 224, at 212; Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”:
Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools,
76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 45 n.228 (2001) (Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents triggered by “radical
improvement.”); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1177, 1193 (2000) (Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents operates where 2G inventor is “radical
improver” of underlying invention.); Robert P. Merges, A Brief Note on Blocking Patents and the
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must be “radical.” However, the matter is not free from doubt and some scholars
have suggested that the 2G advance need only be radical compared to the underlying
1G invention.231 Still others argue that mere “substantial” or “significant” changes
suffice.232 In terms of our present analysis, then, existing precedent would support
any 2G cleverness standard ranging from “substantial” to “radical.” 233
The Court also suggested an alternative theory. 234 The outcome might have
been different, the justices argued, if Westinghouse’s method “would naturally have
suggested the device” invented by Boyden. 235 But in fact, “the Westinghouse patent,
if [Boyden] had had it before him, would scarcely have suggested the method he
adopted to accomplish the same results. Under such circumstances, the law entitles
him to the rights of an independent inventor.”236 This implies that a 2G innovator
should be allowed to claim a defense where she “can truly assert that her claimed
invention was not made possible (i.e., enabled) by what was described by the prior

Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents in Biotechnology Cases, 73 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 878, 883
(1991) (safety valve that prevents patent owners form stifling radical improvements).
231 Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 401, 434 n.166 (2010) (Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents operates when subsequent invention
represents “an overwhelming technological leap” beyond the original patent disclosure.); Carolyn
Abbot & David Booton, Using Patent Law’s Teaching Function to Introduce an Environmental Ethic
into the Process of Technical Innovation, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 219, 249 n.130 (2009) (finding
no infringement where “an improvement exceeds the contribution made by the patented invention”);
Mark A. Lemley, Improvement in IP, supra note 87, at 1010, 1012 (finding that the doctrine applies
to “sufficiently radical” improvers and is “most likely” where the “value of the improvement greatly
exceeds the value of the original invention”).
232 Donald S. Chisum, Bilski v. Kappos: Everything Old is New Again: Weeds and Seeds in the
Supreme Court’s Business Method Patents Decision: New Directions for Regulating Patent Scope, 15
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 11, 24 (2011) (“The prevailing standard for equivalency - substantial change
- can take into account whether, on the one hand, an accused equivalent represents a merely
inconsequential design around, or on the other, represents a significant invention.”); see also, Ben
Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries of Intellectual Property
Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 51 (2004) (Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents requires “a significant
contribution that takes the invention outside of the original, allegedly infringed-upon patent.”); Alan
Devlin, Patent Law’s Parsimony Principle, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1693, 1738 n.220 (2011) (“The
reverse doctrine of equivalents serves to free a sufficiently large leap forward in the prior art from
the claims of an earlier patent that would otherwise block use of the new technology.”); Tex.
Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 846 F.2d 1369, 1371 (Fed Cir. 1988) (applying doctrine
where defendant’s device is “sufficiently different” from plaintiff’s).
233 Although most commentators stress cleverness, a few argue that value should be measured
by economic success or performance. Lemley, Improvement in IP, supra note 87, at 1065 (arguing
that Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents should apply where improvement “is such a major
advance . . . that its value is much greater than the original”); Devlin, supra note 232, at 1739
(arguing that “significant leaps” can be measured by whether the underlying patent’s technology is
“commercially defunct”). Implementing these user-centered concepts would force juries to make fullblown UTILITY-X judgments assessing the absolute utility of different inventions. U.S. law has
long disfavored this notion. N. Scott Pierce, In re Dane K. Fisher: An Exercise in Utility, 6 J. High
Tech. L. 1, 4 (2006) (surveying case law and scholarship distinguishing “positive utility” from
“degree”).
234 Boyden Power Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 573 (1898).
235 Id.
236 Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
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inventor.”237 This sounds very much like a rule that 2G inventors should escape
infringement where the 1G patent possessed no option value for their specific
invention.
B. Pioneer Patents
The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents grew out of an earlier rule that “pioneer”
inventions should receive broader patent protection than mere “improvements.”238
Unlike the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents, the concept of Pioneer Patents expressly
extends to non-literal infringement. Like the Reverse Doctrine, its status is unclear.
While the Federal Circuit seemed to overrule it in the late 1980s, 239 more recent
courts240 and commentators241 continue to recognize it.
There is also a split of authority on how the rule should be phrased. Most courts
hold that pioneer patents must represent a radical improvement over prior art. 242
This standard is variously expressed in phrases like “broad breakthrough,” “major
advance,” “basic operational concept,” "broadly new,” "devoid of significant prior art,”
“primary,” “basic,” “generic,” “original,” or “key.” 243 However, some courts insist that
the “pioneer” and “improvement” concepts only mark the ends of a continuum 244 so
that breadth should be continuously adjusted for even small differences in cleverness.
These alternatives are similar to those at issue in Reverse Doctrine cases and should
presumably be decided the same way.

237 Robert A. Bohrer & John T. Prince, A Tale of Two Proteins:
The FDA’s Uncertain
Interpretation of the Orphan Drug Act, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 365, 407 (1999). The view is also
implicit in arguments that the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents is an equitable doctrine designed to
prevent unjust windfalls.
238 Westinghouse, 170 U.S. at 561–62.
239 Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 846 F.2d 1369, 1370 (Fed Cir. 1988); see
generally Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C.L. REV. 379, 394–95 (2012).
240 See Love, supra note 239, at 395–96.
241 Favorable discussions of the doctrine include John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning
Patent Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 BERKELEY HIGH TECH. L.J. 35 (1995); Michael J. Meurer &
Craig A. Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of
Equivalents 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1989 (2005), and Georgia E. Kralovic, The Principle of Fair Notice: Is
It Prudent Guidance for the Future of Patent Law?, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 89, 104–05 (1998) (remarking
that pioneer status is “given little weight,” but “make[s] sense intuitively.”)
242 Tex. Instruments, 846 F.2d at 1370 (quoting Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170
U.S. 537, 561-62 (1898)).
243 John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 35, 48 (1995).
244 See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Cont'l Oil
Co. v. Cole, 634 F.2d 188, 198 n.7 (5th Cir. 1981); Price v. Lake Sales Supply R.M., Inc., 510 F.2d
388, 394 (10th Cir. 1974); Shields v. Halliburton Co., 667 F.2d 1232, 1238 (5th Cir. 1982); Corning
Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 374 F.2d 473, 476 (3d Cir. 1967).
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C. Written Description
In its most general form, the Written Description requirement dates from the
Supreme Court’s 1822 pronouncement that a patent applicant has an obligation “to
describe what his own improvement is, and to limit [the] patent to such
improvement.”245 However, this function became redundant with the rise of claims
pleading and lay “dormant for many years.” 246 In 1967, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals’ Ruschig decision247 held that a patent whose disclosure potentially
explained how to make “something like half a million possible compounds” 248 could
not be amended to add a specific drug called “chlorpropamide.”249 The reason, the
court explained, was that the inventor had provided no “motivation for wanting to
make the compound in preference to others” and failed to disclose the compound “as
something appellants actually invented.”250
On the face of things, the Ruschig rule was limited to the narrow question of
when amended claims could relate back to the original filing date. 251 In 1997,
however, the Federal Circuit’s Eli Lilly decision broadened the Written Description
requirement to include original claims.252 In particular, it held that inventors trying
to patent a particular gene had to disclose an atom-by-atom description of the
corresponding DNA molecule.253 Most commentators interpreted this as a new and
ad hoc “super-enablement” requirement for biotechnology inventions. 254 Formally,
however, the Court seemed to be announcing the more general principle that courts
should ignore literal infringement when the 1G patent failed to show that the
inventor had actually “possessed” the 2G invention. 255 This view has since been
confirmed by cases that apply the doctrine to non-biotechnology technologies like
furniture design.256
Lilly was widely criticized by scholars257 and some Federal Circuit judges.258 In
2010, the Federal Circuit wrote the en banc Ariad decision to rationalize and explain
the defense.259 The case turned on a drug patent that purported to claim a method of

Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 435 (1822).
Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1653.
247 In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
248 Id. at 993.
249 Id. at 995.
250 Id.
251 Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining
that the doctrine is designed to “prevent the addition of new matter to claims”).
252 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566–67 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
253 Id. at 1567.
254 Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?:
A Comprehensive
Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and its Progeny in the Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 1, 17 (2007) [hereinafter Holman, Eli Lilly].
255 Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1569 (finding no infringement where the claims were invalid for
inadequate written description).
256 Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
257 See, e.g., Holman, Eli Lilly, supra note 254, at 17.
258 See, e.g., id. at 18.
259 Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
245
246
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regulating cellular responses by interfering with the binding of certain molecules. 260
The court held that the Written Description requirement barred the claim because
the patentee had failed to disclose any molecules capable of achieving the desired
result.261 Conceding that the “possession” test had “never been very enlightening,”
the court added that the patent had to “describe an invention understandable to [a]
skilled artisan” and, further, “show that the inventor invented the invention
claimed.”262 This would prevent patent owners from “merely recit[ing] a description
of the problem to be solved while claiming all solutions to it and . . . cover any
compound later actually invented and determined to fall within the claim’s functional
boundaries—leaving it to the pharmaceutical industry to complete an unfinished
invention.”263
Barring Supreme Court intervention, Ariad will likely remain definitive for
decades. For our purposes, it makes three important points. First, Written
Description is a universal defense that applies to literal and non-literal infringement
alike. Second, Written Description focuses on what the 1G inventor actually knew.
This is subtly different from the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents, which asks
whether the 2G inventor would have benefitted from reading the 1G patent. Finally,
the test is objective and asks how a PHOSITA would have interpreted the 1G
inventor’s disclosure. This presumably guards against obscure hints that could only
be understood by a genius-level (e.g. PHOSITA-95) inventor.
D. Analysis (Pt. 1): Option Value Revisited
The Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents, Pioneer Patent, and Written Description
defenses ask juries to make a second PHOSITA-X determination beyond Graham’s
baseline PHOSITA-50 inquiry. We now ask how well these additional inquiries
narrow the gap between doctrine and our third social goal.
We begin by asking which defenses best fit our option value theory of utility. We
have already said that option value often depends on the 2G inventors’ ability to spot
unusually clever (e.g. PHOSITA-95) applications and improvements. The Reverse
Doctrine captures such cases by asking whether the 1G patent would have helped the
2G inventor achieve her insight or, conversely, “would scarcely have suggested the
method . . . adopted.”264 By comparison, the Written Description test is narrowly
focused on what the 1G inventor actually knew and communicated in terms that
would have been understandable to a PHOSITA-50. This necessarily excludes hints
to 2G geniuses that often possess significant option value. Judges who accept our
option value arguments should want to replace Written Description with a
reinvigorated Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents defense.
260 Id. at 1340–42 (“disclosing their discoveries and claiming methods for regulating cellular
responses to external stimuli by reducing NF-kB activity in a cell”).
261 Id. at 1355 (“Thus, to satisfy the written description requirement for the asserted claims,
the specification must demonstrate that Ariad possessed the claimed methods by sufficiently
disclosing molecules capable of reducing NF-kB activity.”).
262 Id. at 1351.
263 Id. at 1353.
264 Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 573 (1898).
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E. Analysis (Pt. 2): Allocation Rules
We have seen that courts and commentators have interpreted the Reverse
Doctrine of Equivalents, Pioneer Patents, and Written Description defenses in
different ways over the years. Here, we examine the various interpretations and ask
which one best serves our third social goal.
Absolute Cleverness. Some courts have argued that the Reverse Doctrine of
Equivalents and Pioneer Patent defenses should apply whenever the 2G patent is
exceptionally clever in absolute terms. However, this ignores situations where the
1G patent’s cleverness (and, implicitly cost) is comparable to or exceeds the 2G
patent’s. Courts that accept our analysis should reject these decisions out of hand.
Direct Comparison. Some versions of the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents and
Pioneer Patent defenses hold that the 2G patent should escape infringement when its
cleverness is only slightly larger than the 1G patent’s. Conceptually, this is
equivalent to comparing the 2G patent to a PHOSITA-X threshold located at the
peak of the 1G invention’s verdict distribution. After that, the analysis is the same
as our discussion of strong Doctrine of Equivalents rules. 265 In particular, we expect
the defense to produce improved allocations whenever the 1G and 2G inventions are
comparably clever.
Conversely, inventions that possess markedly different
cleverness will usually receive 50:50 (or 0:100) allocations without regard to
cleverness or relative cost.
Radical Improvements. Most Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents and Pioneer
Patent cases specify that the 2G invention must represent a “radical” improvement
over its 1G predecessor to escape infringement. Figure 5 summarizes the situation.
Reading from right to left, the PHOSITA-50 standard establishes a probabilistic zone
(“Allocation A”) that ranges from 50:50 to 0:100 as before. Now, however, there is a
second probabilistic zone (“Allocation B”) where the 2G patent is radically cleverer
than its 1G predecessor. Because the radical improvement rule does not apply where
the two inventions are similarly clever, our first Default A zone is centered on the 2G
patent. This puts the 50:50 default blocking outcome exactly where it should be:
where the two inventions are already known to have similar cleverness. Finally,
there may also be a second (“Default B”) zone that provides 0:100 allocations in cases
where the 2G patent is much cleverer than its 1G predecessor. 266

See supra Figure 4 and accompanying text.
We should not insist on such radical improvements that the new Allocation B zone overlaps
the original PHOSITA-50 region and becomes redundant. This could happen, for example, if juries
interpreted “radical” improvement in such extreme terms that the defense was only available to,
say, PHOSITA-99 inventions.
265
266
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FIGURE 5

Based on the foregoing, we argue that Pioneer Patent/Reverse Doctrine of
Equivalents defenses that require “radical” improvement rules are the best way to
implement our third policy goal. Courts that accept our analysis should discard the
Written Description test and concentrate on reviving these doctrines.
VIII. DOCTRINE VS. THEORY: ASSESSING THE SHORTFALL
We have now completed our survey of how patent doctrine implements modern
neoclassical theory. On the positive side, we have seen that doctrine does a
reasonably good job of tracking our three neoclassical goals. At the same time, any
patent system that includes Graham’s PHOSITA test is unavoidably imperfect. This
leaves us in an awkward position. If the current system worked exceptionally well –
or badly – we would immediately know whether to keep it. Instead, the question
stands on a knife’s edge.
This Section begins by recapitulating the strengths and weaknesses of existing
doctrine. We then ask whether a radically different system that discarded the
PHOSITA proxy and tried to estimate R&D costs directly could provide a better fit.
A. How Good is the Proxy?
We have argued that the PHOSITA standard is best understood as a proxy for
R&D cost. Like all proxies, this introduces various possible errors.
Imperfect Proxy. No proxy is perfect. We have seen that there are a significant
number of cases where cleverness says little or nothing about R&D cost. In other
cases, incremental changes in cleverness can receive disproportionately large (or
small) rewards.
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Ignoring Profit. Because our PHOSITA proxy only tracks relative R&D costs, it
cannot detect the moment when each inventor recoups her absolute cost and begins
to earn a profit. For this reason, no PHOSITA-based doctrine can ever fully
implement our Absolute Scope rule by redistributing profit upstream.
Systematic Error. Our probabilistic PHOSITA mechanism often generates 50:50
or 0:100 default allocations that are divorced from cleverness or, implicitly, cost.
Adding a Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents defense mitigates but does not solve this
problem.
Under-Rewarding Multi-Step Inventions.
Technologies based on multiple
patents often lead to multiple lawsuits. In these cases, collateral estoppel will
truncate patent rewards compared to a single, one-shot lawsuit.
A Cushion for Mistakes? We have argued that any Graham-based doctrine is
inherently imperfect. That being said, policymakers can still influence which kinds
of mistakes it makes. More specifically, it is always better to have an over-priced
invention than no invention at all. This suggests that legislators and judges should
err on the side of broad patent monopolies and liberal rewards. The argument is
even stronger in the multi-inventor case, where breaking just one link in a long
development chain can kill promising technologies.
The good news is that current doctrine allocates reward on the basis of relative
costs. This means that each inventor will still be able to cover her costs provided
that the absolute reward is large enough. At the same time, a deliberately inflated
reward violates our second policy goal. Given current state of the art, any attempt to
adjust this tradeoff is largely a matter of guesswork.
Industry-Specific Rules. This article has pursued the traditional intuition that
global rules are attractive and worthwhile. But real judges do not need to be purists .
Instead, industry-specific rules can and do provide a safety valve when global
doctrine fails to fit to conditions on the ground.
Pharmaceutical R&D provides a spectacular example of such ad hoc-ery.267 This
is not surprising since the industry often features (a) inventions that have no
immediate use, and (b) R&D costs that typically rise several-fold for each step along
the development pipeline.
These unusual facts make industry-specific rules
particularly attractive. At the same time, Big Pharma is uniquely well-funded and
able to protect its interests. How would we know if other, poorer industries were
encountering similar problems? Unlike industry-specific rules, a sensible global rule
protects rich and poor alike. For this reason, judges should adopt ad hoc solutions
reluctantly and then only as a last resort.
B. The Road Not Taken
It is not enough to say that the PHOSITA standard is “good” or “bad.” We must
also ask, “Compared to what?” Here, the obvious alternative is asking courts to
267 For example, courts may be more willing to apply the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents in
biotechnology than other industries. See Handley, supra note 224, at 45–50; Scripps Clinic &
Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm.
Co., 706 F. Supp. 94, 96 (D. Mass. 1989).
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estimate R&D cost directly. Doctrinally, this means moving the allocation inquiry
from liability to damages. Existing case law suggests at least two ways to do this.
Apportionment. The most direct solution is to apportion revenue according to
each patent’s respective “contribution” to products purchased by end-users. The idea
is not as strange as it sounds. Indeed, some district courts apportioned damages in
the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries 268 while Congress debated the idea as
recently as 2009.269 There is also considerable scholarly support for the idea.
Professor Amy Landers makes a compelling argument that reasonable royalty
damages would divide revenues more fairly among patent owners. 270 Similarly,
Professor Peter Lee argues that the related equitable doctrine of “accession” creates
“a middle zone of flexibility” between 0:100 and 100:0 outcomes. 271 This might
“embolden” courts to allocate reward differently between pioneer and improving
inventors.272
From our standpoint, neither of these proposals is quite right. The reason is
that they focus on each patent’s “contribution” in providing value (i.e., utility) to endusers. This concept is decidedly different from asking what costs each inventor
incurred to advance the technology. Even so, shifting the allocation inquiry to R&D
costs sounds like a minor detail.
Compulsory Licenses. Compulsory licenses provide a second way to apportion
revenue. Professor Tur-Sinai has argued that this is the best way to implement the
Absolute Scope rule.273 However, modern courts are notoriously hostile to the idea.274
That being said, the concept remains fairly mainstream and continues to appear in
academic articles.275
New Headaches. The foregoing approaches would require courts to estimate
corporate R&D costs directly. Naively, this sounds straightforward. On reflection,
though, one could say the same thing about public utility commissions’ efforts to set
fair rates of return. In practice, direct cost estimation would require specialized
bureaucracies and make frequent errors. As the U.S. Supreme Court has pointed out
in the antitrust context, regulation is a “daunting task” 276 which courts should
avoid.277
Replacing Graham. We have argued that any doctrine that includes Graham’s
non-obviousness test automatically contains a baseline allocation rule for successive
inventors. On the other hand, our first social goal still requires a threshold standard.
If we overrule Graham we must replace it with something. The least radical solution
is to retain Graham and only estimate costs for whatever patents survive the nonLanders, supra note 188, at 499–500 (2012).
See Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009).
270 Landers, supra note 188, at 505–07. (arguing that the current reasonable royalty
calculation standards are too restrictive, but could be reworked to provide a more fair outcome).
271 Peter Lee, supra note 230, at 239.
272 Id.
273 Tur-Sinai, supra note 62, at 743.
274 Merges & Nelson, supra note 17, at 840.
275 Nielsen & Samardzija, supra note 16, at 535 (describing a recent survey of the compulsory
licensing as an alternative to damages in both theory and practice); see also, Rose, supra note 230, at
618–24 (advocating “limited” compulsory licenses where “market failure” exists).
276 Verizon Commc’ns., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004).
277 Id. at 415.
268
269
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obviousness screen. However, this would only improve incentives for 2G inventions
that are much cleverer than PHOSITA-50. An ambitious reform would replace
Graham itself. Under this rule, R&D projects that incurred above-average costs
would be deemed non-obvious. This, however, would expand the inquiry still further:
in addition to estimating the parties’ own R&D costs, the court would also have to
estimate the average cost of similar projects throughout the industry.
CONCLUSION
Nearly a half-century has passed since the Supreme Court’s Graham decision
built neoclassical economics into the foundations of patent doctrine. But while
innovation economics has moved on, most legal scholars still treat the literature as a
grab bag of conflicting theories. This gloomy assessment seems to put global rules
out of reach. It is also unreasonable. Far from being fragmented, the various
neoclassical insights share the same fundamental assumptions and methods. For
this reason, they are best seen as special cases of a deeper and more general theory.
This article has identified and explored three social goals that any such theory must
have. Two of these are generalized versions of principles (non-obviousness, reward
size) that were already familiar in the 1960s. The third specifies how patent reward
should be divided among successive inventors.
Remarkably, current doctrine uses Graham’s PHOSITA standard to address all
three goals. This practically guarantees that attempts to address one goal will have
unintended impacts on the others. We have argued that separate PHOSITA-X
standards can relax this link for our first and second principles. Future attempts to
reform the Doctrine of Equivalents should take advantage of this fact. At the same
time, any doctrine based on a PHOSITA non-obviousness test automatically
implements economically inefficient allocations. A revived Reverse Doctrine/Pioneer
Patents defense would go some distance toward narrowing this gap.
No doctrine that includes the PHOSITA concept can ever be perfect. Full
implementation of our third social goal would require judges to scrap the current
system in favor of estimating corporate R&D costs directly. This is bound to be a
large and error-prone undertaking. By comparison, the PHOSITA standard—despite
its flaws—is at least reasonably accurate and can be implemented by judges and
juries. Radical change, if it comes at all, should be left to Congress.

